

THE
SĀMKHYA KĀRIKĀ OF ISVARAKRSNA


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THE SĀMKHYA KĀRIKĀ OF IŚVARAKRŚNA



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Being a treatise on
PSYCHO-PHYSICS FOR SELF-REALIZATION

NO. 165

Edited and Translated by
RADHANATH PHUKAN, M.A.,B.L.,
Vedānta Vācaspati

पौराणिक ग्रन्थ संस्कृत विभाग आयो
दी. ए. ए. स. रामानुज -



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PREFACE

Several years ago, I translated the Sāṅkhya Kārikās and then the Brahma-Sūtras into Assamese.

Indian Philosophy I never did profess to know. Nevertheless I translated those books because they had not been translated into Assamese so long. Later on, with a view to add to my humble contribution to my mother language, I translated the Gītā and wrote some other booklets on allied subjects.

In all those books I tried to explain my points by citing illustrations from modern physical science. It is no doubt unorthodox to try to understand spiritual truths with a materialistic outlook, but my attempt was perhaps not entirely unsuccessful, for the Bhavan's Journal (15th Dec., 1957) reviewing one of my booklets, translated into Hindi by my daughter-in-law, wrote as follows :

"The Hindi version of the above book by Shri Radhanath Phukan, M.A., B. L., Vedānta Vācaspati, is a very valuable piece of literature. The book was originally written in Assamese. The author has successfully tried to explain to the layman the highly philosophical and moral ideas of the Upaniṣads. Fine commentaries at the end of each story which are the result of deep study of Western thinkers like Eddington and others add much to the value of the book."

Some little time ago, a friend of mine, Dr. Ajitranjan Bhattacharji of the Calcutta University, insisted that these books should be translated into English so that the new method of treatment may receive wider publicity.

Another friend of mine, Shri Sailendra Nath Sen-Gupta, Judge of the City Civil Court, Calcutta, undertook to translate these books, and he actually translated Parts I, II and III of the Introduction to the Sāṅkhya

Darśana. He did so out of kindness to me and I shall ever remain grateful to him.

At this stage, it was suggested to me that the Assamese books having been meant for laymen with or without any scientific or philosophical background were somewhat verbose and even contained some repetitions. The present English translation is meant for another purpose and for another class of readers. Here, as it were, I have framed an issue and am submitting it to a court of learned Pandits for a decision. The issue is :

- (1) Whether the Sāṃkhya Philosophy is atheistic and without a clear meaning ; or
- (2) whether it is a precisely scientific treatise on "Psycho-Physics for God-realization".

Accordingly, I have made this book as brief as I could. It has become practically a new rendering of the Sāṃkhya Kārikās and not a mere translation from Assamese.

I am particularly grateful to Dr. Mahāmahopādhyāya Gopināth Kavirāj M.A., D. LITT., of Vārāṇasi, who received me very kindly and took the trouble of going through the type-script copy of the book. He has now returned it to me with some kind words which I am publishing below as a foreword from such a high authority.

Lastly, I have great pleasure in acknowledging the valuable assistance rendered to me by my cousin R. R. Khaund in all matters connected with the publication of this book. I am also indebted to Shri Amalendu Sen, Advocate, Calcutta, who has helped in revising the script and reading the proofs.

*Jorhat, Assam,
June 15, 1960*

R. N. PHUKAN

FOREWORD

I have glanced through the pages of an Ms. of Shri Radhanath Phukan's work on Sāṁkhya Darśan. It is an English translation of Īśvara Kṛṣṇa's Sāṁkya Kārikās with Introduction and notes in English. In the Introduction he has dealt with the fundamentals of Sāṁkhya Philosophy and Psychology, and in this study his knowledge of the implications of modern physical science has been made to throw helpful light.

Though there have been several English renderings of these Kārikās, the present translation has a value of its own and will, I hope, be properly appreciated by those for whom it is intended.

8-4-1960

GOPINATH KAVIRAJ

INTRODUCTION

Part I—Revolution in Western Science

(1)

There is no important difference between the Sāṃkhya and the Vedānta Philosophy; what difference there is, is in the angle of vision. In Vedānta, the world is seen from the *outside* with a subtle philosophical mind; hence in order to understand the reasoning of the Vedānta, it requires a minimum intellectual capacity.

In Sāṃkhya, on the other hand, the world is seen broadly from the worldly point of view, it takes one gradually to matters more and more subtle and ultimately leads him to a stage from which he may easily realize all the fundamentals.

The method of analysis is the same in the Sāṃkhya as in the modern science. In science also gross matter is taken up first for analysis which is carried ultimately to such a subtle stage that one may doubt whether the universe is at all real. The Relativity and the Quantum theories lend support to the conclusions of the Sāṃkhya Philosophy and to one who is conversant with these theories, a proper understanding of the Sāṃkhya Philosophy would be

quite easy. For this reason, I shall discuss very briefly one or two important matters dealt with by Western Science which may help us in understanding the underlying principles of the Sāṃkhya theory of creation. This discussion may be skipped over by those readers who may be familiar with the Relativity theory and the Quantum mechanics.

(2)

About 1900 A.D. scientists were of the view that the Universe was like a big machine. From dust particles right up to the planets and the stars, everything material was held to be regulated by the natural laws, most of which had already been discovered by science. It was thought that a man could become omniscient and all-powerful, if he could somehow fully grasp all these laws.

The world was taken by surprise when the materialistic science discovered complicated machines like the aeroplane, the radio and the cinema. The result was an infinite faith in science, so much so, that one was prepared to hold that even one's own soul had no existence because its existence could not be demonstrated by scientific experiment. Men became indifferent to God, because it was felt that the world

would go on as before according to the natural laws discovered by scientists, whether God really existed or not.

It is not that the scientists at this time were all unbelievers ; as a matter of fact most of them were by nature religious-minded and God-fearing. But they found it difficult to reconcile their religious belief with their convictions as scientists. Thus Eddington states, "In the last century and also in this there must have been many scientific men who kept their science and religion in water-tight compartments. One set of beliefs held good in the laboratory and another set of beliefs in church, and no serious effort was made to harmonize them.... Religion first became possible for a reasonable scientific man about the year 1927." (Eddington : *The Nature of the Physical World*, p. 3)

I think it is for this reason that, in 1893, Madame Blavatsky forecasted that soon the materialistic science would receive a death-blow. This is what she actually stated : "It is at the close of great cycles that such events generally take place. We are at the very close of the cycle of 5,000 years of the present Aryan Kaliyuga, and between this time and 1897 there will be a large rent in the veil of Nature and materialistic science will receive a death-blow." (*Secret Doctrine*, Vol. I, p. 671)

Her prognosis was fulfilled almost literally, for a revolution in the world of science commenced from 1904. This revolution is still proceeding. But now the Western Science is no longer materialistic, and is actually idealistic. On this point it would be interesting to see what Sir James Jeans says :

"The law and order which we find in the Universe are most easily described—and also, I think, most easily explained in the language of idealism. Thus, subject to the reservation already mentioned, we may say that present-day science is favourable to idealism. In brief, idealism has always maintained that, as the beginning of the road by which we explore nature is mental, the chances are that the end also will be mental. To this the present-day science adds that, at the farthest point she has so far reached, much, and possibly all, that was not mental, has disappeared and nothing new has come in that is not mental. Yet, who shall say what we may find awaiting us at the next corner ?" (*New Background of Science*, p. 307)

The present view of science is, to quote Eddington, that "The purely objective sources of the objective element in our observational knowledge have already been named ; they are Life, Consciousness and Spirit. We reach, then, the position of idealist as opposed to materialist

philosophy. The purely objective world is the spiritual world and the material world is subjective in the sense of selective-subjectivism.”
(The Philosophy of Physical Science, p. 69)

It would be interesting to discuss what led to this wonderful revolution in Western Science.

(3)

In 1887, an epoch-making experiment was conducted by two scientists, Dr. Michelson, an American, and Prof. Morley, a German. The experiment was repeated by other scientists but it is necessary to refer only to the experiment repeated by Morley and Miller in 1904. The original object of the experiment was to ascertain the existence of Ether. The existence of Ether could not be demonstrated by the experiment but it proved something which was at that time not even dreamt of by most scientists. It proved that if a scale or anything having length moves at a tremendous speed, speed approaching that of light, then the length of the scale will remain constant if it is kept always at right angles to the direction of the speed, but that it would contract if it is kept parallel to the line of the motion. The contraction would depend on the velocity and

the length would be reduced to nothing if the velocity equals that of light. The contraction is known as the Fitzgerald Contraction which can be calculated easily if the velocity is known. It would certainly be astounding if the length of a yardstick varied with the direction and rate of its velocity. It seems most unnatural but it is a scientific truth. Eddington says as follows :

“There is really nothing mysterious about the Fitzgerald Contraction. It would be an unnatural property of a rod pictured in the old way as a continuous substance occupying space in virtue of its substantiality ; but it is an entirely natural property of a swarm of particles held in delicate balance of electro-magnetic forces, and occupying space by buffeting away anything that tries to enter. The Fitzgerald Contraction is not an imperfection but a fixed and characteristic property of matter, like inertia.”¹

It is impossible to ascertain if anything in the universe is stationary. It seems, every

¹It will be shown later on in my notes on Kārikā XXXIII that this “Fitzgerald Contraction” appears in all our calculations because we calculate Time and Space separately instead of regarding them as an inseparable unit designated by modern science as “Space-Time”.

constituent of the universe is moving at tremendous speeds. The stars, it has been found, are all moving away from us at enormous speeds, hundreds of miles per second.

But a scientist living on the Pole-Star, for instance, thinks that the earth is moving at 1000 miles per second while he himself is stationary. In the same way we here think that our Earth is stationary while the Pole-Star is moving at the rate of 1000 miles a second. It is impossible to say to which of us the observed relative velocity of 1000 miles a second really belongs.

Let us, however, take it that we are stationary and then think how the Fitzgerald Contraction has affected all the calculations made by us or by the scientist on the Pole-Star. One of us must be wrong.

The constancy of the measuring scale was the only thing on which the whole structure of classical physics was based. It does not matter whether we measure with a yardstick or a theodolite or merely judge distances by the eye—all methods of measurement will agree—and must agree.

Suppose we have made a survey of the world or a portion of it and located the surrounding objects in their respective positions in space. We, of course, overlook the Fitzgerald

Contraction, because we are stationary, as we think.

Now, let us see what the scientist on the Pole-Star will think of the picture drawn by us, if he can see it and compare it with the picture he himself has drawn of the same frame of space. His scale contracts in one direction, as stated above, and consequently all his measurements of lengths in that direction will be too great. A square on our configuration of space will be a rectangle to him. He will, no doubt, exclaim : "How unfortunate are those people on the Earth ; they cannot have a right view of the frame of space in which they live—and this is because they are moving at a rate of 1000 miles per second ; they must have deduced a system of laws of nature which must have been vitiated by their wrong measurements of lengths in one direction ; how unfortunate !"

It was long known to the scientists that the colour of anything moving at a great speed changes from blue to green, green to red, or the reverse, according to its speed. This is known as the "Doppler Effect" applied to light. Thus it was known that colour varied with motion. But no one could imagine that the concept of space, the size or the shape of objects, and their distance from one another

also required modification. The Michelson-Morley experiment thus brought about a conceptual revolution in the scientific world. After this famous experiment, *everything* that the scientists supposed about the nature of the physical world was found to rest on very slender foundations.

And this was how the classical scheme of Physics first came to be questioned.

The first question that troubled the Physicists now was this : "If creatures of different planets have different ideas of the frame of space they are living in, if they see the world differently, what, then, is the true picture of the world ? How should it look to a man in a planet which is at absolute rest ?"

Then, in 1911, Lord Rutherford discovered that inside the atoms there was nothing but mere emptiness. There are, no doubt, electrons revolving round a nucleus, but it was found that even these consist of electro-magnetic waves and nothing else. If that is so, the second question which confronted the scientists was, "How is it that we all see around us objects of various shapes and colour ?"

It was Einstein who found the solution to the first question in 1915 when he announced to the world his General Theory of Relativity. He demonstrated that since everything in

this material universe, from the humblest speck of dust to the mighty stars and nebulae, is moving in the space at tremendous speeds and because space and time are relative, there can be no absolute measure of length or time. Everyone thinks that he is stationary while everybody else is moving. He thinks that what he sees is the real picture of the Universe and that what others see is erroneous. In truth, however, stability, length, shape and even colour which depends on wave-lengths, are all relative. How the Universe would appear to a person depends upon his position in the Universe and his velocity. It follows that it is impossible for anyone to know the real nature of the Universe.

(4)

Einstein proved not only that the shape and size of the external Universe are relative ; he also proved that our concept of time is relative depending, as it does, upon the velocity of the observer in space. This can be easily understood by anyone who is conversant with advanced mathematics.

From our knowledge of elementary geography we know that if a man takes his lunch in an aeroplane at noon and travels from east to west

with a velocity of about 1000 miles an hour, time will appear to him to stand still. It will always be noon for him. Similarly, though not exactly for the same reason, if a man travels through the empty space of the Universe with a velocity of about 1,86,000 miles per second, which is the velocity of light in empty space, time for him will stand still. Let us suppose there are two friends, one of whom travels in space with a velocity equal to that of light. When he returns to the Earth after his sojourn, he will find that his friend has added to his years but he still retains his original age. Thus, the two men have not lived the same time between their two meetings. This paradox may be verified mathematically but it is not yet possible to verify it experimentally.

On this point Eddington says : "Although we cannot try the experiment of sending a man to another part of the Universe, we have enough scientific knowledge to compute the rates of atomic and other physical processes in a body at rest and a body travelling rapidly. We can say definitely that the bodily processes in the traveller occur more slowly than the corresponding processes in the man at rest (*i.e.*, more slowly according to the Astronomer Royal's time). This is not particularly mysterious. It is well known both from theory and experiment

that the mass or inertia of matter increases when the velocity increases. The retardation is a natural consequence of the greater inertia. Thus, so far as the bodily processes are concerned, the fast-moving traveller lives more slowly. His cycle of digestion and fatigue ; the rate of his muscular response to stimulus ; the development of his body from youth to age ; the material processes in his brain which must more or less keep step with the passage of thoughts and emotions ; the watch which ticks in his waistcoat pocket ;—all these must be slowed down in the same ratio. If the speed of travel is very great we may find that, whilst the stay-at-home individual has aged 70 years, the traveller has aged only one year. He has only found appetite for 365 breakfasts, lunches etc. ; his intellect, clogged by a slow-moving brain, has only traversed the amount of thought appropriate to one year of terrestrial life. His watch which gives a more accurate and scientific reckoning confirms this. Judging by the time which consciousness attempts to measure after its own rough fashion—and I repeat, this is the only reckoning of time which we have a right to expect to be distinct from space—the two men have not lived the same time between the two meetings.” (*The Nature of the Physical World*)

Thus, if anyone finds it possible to move in empty space with the velocity of light, he may retain his youth for ever like the ancient sages, Sanaka and Sananda.

In the *Viṣṇupurāṇa*, we read the story of princess Revatī, who lived in the Satyayuga. When she grew up, her father went up to heaven to consult his friend Brahmā about her marriage. Brahmā said to him, "In course of the few moments you have been here, Satyayuga as well as Tretāyuga have passed away in the world where you live, and the Dvāparayuga also is about to come to an end. So you go back to the earth immediately and give your daughter in marriage to Balarāma, brother of Śrī Kṛṣṇa." Fortunately Revatī had accompanied her father to heaven and so her age did not increase. In the Purāṇas there are many such stories. We learnt in our childhood that a day of the gods is equal to a human year.

It is quite likely that some of the readers will say that these are merely tales and not the truth. But it seems that the sages who thought out such stories had a clear idea about the truth regarding space and time. They knew quite well that the measure of time was not the same everywhere. But this truth we do not realize easily because we have many erroneous ideas about space and time.

Let us take the case of a man born both deaf and dumb. Can we say that he has no idea about time? No; he certainly has the same idea about time as we have, but being deaf and dumb he is not able to express his ideas to another. He would not know anything about measure of time like hours and minutes. All that he would be able to say, if he could speak, is ‘this is the time for this’ or ‘this is the time for that’.

What we call “Time” is really a measure of time. Strictly speaking, the real time is one and indivisible. The concept of endless time is the same as the concept of our own existence. “I exist” means that I am always living in endless time. The English scientists call this concept ‘becoming’ or ‘time lived’. This is the real Time. But we have seen that it is actually relative,—its length, like spatial length, depends on velocity.

This concept of ‘relative’ time is an entirely personal matter. It is not realized like other concepts from the external world through the senses. The concept will remain even if the entire external world, including all external events and all external matters, becomes annihilated. It cannot be expressed or communicated to others. This relative or real time has thus no connection with “Space”. In practical

life, however, this realization of the concept of (relative) time, which is the only real time we know, has to be indicated to others at every moment, for otherwise it would not be possible for one to continue as a social being. When I see a piece of cloth, I can at once infer its length and, so far as I am concerned, it is not necessary to measure the length at all. But if I have to express my estimate of its length, I have to adopt a unit of measurement, yard or cubit, which is understood by others. In the same manner, if I have to express to another person my concept of my relative time, I have to adopt a unit, by a reference to an external event. This means that I have now to mix up time (relative time) with space. In order to do so, two things are necessary : (1) I myself and that person must live at about the same space in the universe, or else, our concepts of relative time will not be the same ; (2) the external events mentioned above must be such as may be seen by both of us at the same time.

It is on the basis of these assumptions that I can explain to others living in the same world as myself my concept of time in terms of, say, hours and minutes. These hours and minutes are units adopted for the sake of convenience only. But such units, or measurement of time by means of such units, would be valid

for my world only. It is only a makeshift measurement of time. But in itself it is not relative, because it is identical for everyone of us in this world, since I have adopted a unit on the basis of external events, like sunrise or sun-set, perceived by everyone of us. This is the time of our everyday use, a mixture of relative time with space. It is called by the scientists "Astronomical Time" in order to distinguish it from Einstein's Relative Time. (I will show in Kārikā XXXIII that according to Sāṁkhya also this astronomical time is no time at all.)

Now, consider how we can explain this makeshift measurement of the time-interval to a person living in a different world. If I may say so, there is no way whatsoever for doing so, because : (1) his concept of relative time does not coincide with mine, and (2) there can be no external event which can be perceived by both of us at the same time. The event which I can see now was seen by the denizens of another world perhaps thousands of millions of years ago, or it may be that it will be perceived by them thousands of millions of years hence. This is so because light has a velocity and so takes time to traverse vast distances. Thus the inhabitants of a star, millions and millions of miles away, will see an event which took place

recently in this world, such as the explosion of the atom bomb at Hiroshima, many many years hereafter. So if there is an explosion in the star Rohinī (Aldebaran), we shall see it many years thereafter. It follows that the division of time into present, past and future would not be identical in all the worlds.

Later on we shall see that there is no difference between the Sāmkhya Philosophy and modern science regarding the nature of time.

(5)

I referred to Lord Rutherford before. In the Court of Scientists, Lord Rutherford, rather than Einstein, would be held responsible for the far-reaching revolution in science which has been proceeding for the last 40 years or more. It was Lord Rutherford who proved the fundamental principle of the Sāmkhya philosophy that there is nothing real in this world except Energy in the form of electricity.

The entire scientific world in Europe was stunned by this discovery. But at the same time this discovery has enhanced the prestige of the Sāmkhya philosophy. Lord Rutherford found by experimentally smashing the atom that it consists of empty space full of electrical

energy. Inside the atom there is a nucleus, round which revolve some electrons which are merely negative charges of electricity. The nucleus itself consists of Protons, which are positive charges of electricity, and some Electrons (except in the case of hydrogen, an atom of which consists of one proton and one electron only). Thus, a number of protons and a lesser number of electrons are cemented together to form the nucleus. The total number of protons in an atom must be equal to the number of electrons (both revolving and cemented) in it. It follows that in the Universe there are as many protons as electrons. It has been calculated that the total of each is of the order 10^{79} .

The atom is like the Solar System, the nucleus corresponding to the sun and the revolving electrons to the planets. It is by the number of rotating electrons in an atom that the chemists identify elements. The total number of electrons in an atom determines the chemical as well as the physical properties of the element. To all intents and purposes, the nucleus of an atom is inert. The source of activity in an atom is the electron alone. In the Universe, all activity and all sorts of transformations are due to the activity of the electrons. There cannot be a smaller or subtler particle of energy than an electron.

The Quantum Theory is now in the making. Scientists are now making endless researches about it. But we are not concerned with these researches ; because whatever further view is in prospect, the experimental fact will always remain the same—viz. that energy in the form of electric charges are the only ingredients of the physical universe. Scientific theories are always changing : The wave theory of light replaced the corpuscular theory, heat was changed from substance (calorie) to energy of motion, electricity was changed from fluid to nuclei of strain in Ether and so forth. But all these changes of views were based on experimental facts which are unalterable. A scientific theory is like a solution of a cross-word puzzle. It must fit in with the experimental facts which are unalterable and are true for all time, just as a solution of a cross-word puzzle must fit in with the words given as unalterable. Even if the scheme of physics which Einstein, Bohr, Rutherford and a galaxy of other eminent scientists are building up, even if this scheme is doomed to be replaced by a better one within the next fifty years, even then, the experimental fact will remain that matter is nothing but electrons and protons—mere electric charges. It is unthinkable that science can ever revert to the old idea of a substance in the atom.

This is all we want for our present purpose of studying the Sāmkhya Philosophy.

(6)

If we think of the Universe as a whole, we readily see that it is ceaselessly undergoing transformation, and till the end of the creation this transformation will go on. There is not a moment when the Universe does not suffer any change. But this transformation is not merely a pointless one. The Universe is, according to scientists, heading towards disorganization from an organized state. There will come a time after which there will be no transformation or change of any sort. Everything will ultimately be transformed into pure energy. There is no power known which can stop this headlong progress towards complete disorganization. A green plantain ripens with time, but it is not possible by any means to make a ripe plantain green again. Just as time proceeds ceaselessly from past to future, so also the movement of energy is ceaseless towards the accomplishment of its predestined object. Energy can only move forward and never backward. With time, Entropy increases, never does it decrease. This is the famous Second Law of Thermo-dynamics. Entropy corres-

ponds to change from organized state towards disorganization.

So also the Sāmkhya Philosophy says that there is no end to the transformation of the Guṇas and that the said transformation has an object.

It is obvious that such transformation of the Guṇas, or what is the same thing as increase of entropy, cannot continue indefinitely. Just as there is a limit to tearing a piece of paper into shreds, so also there is a limit to the transformation of universal energy, that is, increase of entropy. This final state is, in the words of modern science, a state of "Thermodynamic Equilibrium". This is nothing but the Final Destruction of the Universe, the Mahāpralaya of our Śāstra. At this state there is no past, present or future, no active energy, no light, heat or anything. It is conceived that after this there will be an infusion of energy leading to a fresh creation. This is practically what is suggested by the Science of Thermo-dynamics.

This is also what has been stated in our religious books about creation and destruction of the Universe.

The Second Law of Thermo-dynamics is so firmly established that no scientist can ever doubt its truth.

Eddington accepts this position, but has stated it very cautiously and in a roundabout manner :

“Scientists and theologians alike must regard as somewhat crude the native theological doctrine which, suitably disguised, is at present to be found in every text book of thermo-dynamics, namely, that some billions of years ago, God wound up the material universe, and has left it to change ever since.... It is one of those conclusions from which we can see no logical escape...only it suffers from the drawback that it is incredible.” (*The Nature of the Physical World*, p. 90) Then again “...the present course will repeat itself many times over—an infinite number of times in fact—before ‘t’ reaches infinity. Don’t ask me whether I really believe or expect you to believe that this will happen. Logic is logic. That’s all I say.” (*New Pathways in Science*, p. 62)¹

This is also the teaching of the Sāṃkhyā Philosophy, viz. that creation is cyclic.

¹ Sir Arthur Eddington, as one of the greatest scientists of the world, cannot but say so. He cannot go beyond the scientific method of investigation. There can be no scientific investigation on the assumption that God exists and does everything by miracles.

(7)

It is the conclusion of modern science, based on numerous experiments, that in the Universe there is nothing real except waves of electrical energy. Thus says Eddington, "It is pertinent to remember that the concept of substance has disappeared from fundamental physics. What we have ultimately come down to is a form—waves ! waves !! waves !!! Or, for a change, if we we come down to the Relativity Theory, a curvature of space-time, and in Quantum Theory, a periodicity of waves." (*Philosophy of Physical Science*, p. 110)

In the words of Sir James Jeans, "The electric and magnetic forces are mental constructs of our own, resulting from our misguided efforts to understand the motions of the particles." (*Physics and Philosophy*, p. 200)

Thus in Modern Science, solid matter has successively been reduced to empty atoms, then electrical particles, then electro-magnetic waves, which ultimately are shown to be forms of energy, and, in the last resort, to be mere ideas !

Let us, however, assume that the Universe is a form of energy and that energy has an objective existence. The question that next arises is how then do we see so many solid objects of various shapes. On this point the

reader is referred to Verses nos. XVI and XXXIV of the text, or to Eddington's *New Pathways in Science*. According to the Relativity Theory, no one can ever know what the Universe is really like. Matter itself is, according to Modern Science, unobservable. Matter is only a sum-total of electric energy which affects our senses and produces a sensation in our brain. But science is unable to elucidate the matter any further. External to ourselves there is only Energy and inside only the Mind. The external energy in the form of waves strikes our eyes and other organs of senses and then our mind feels something. This is the only relation we have with the external world. It is (to quote Eddington) as if I am living inside a fort besieged by enemies, and of all that is happening outside, I get the news only by receiving some signals. These signals, which correspond to electric waves, are like so many cipher codes which my mind deciphers, and gives them shape, colour, taste and so on, which thereafter become the subject-matter of my knowledge. I feel not matter, but *about* matter. At the same time I know that the waves of energy which produce such feeling have themselves neither shape nor substance, colour, or any other sensory characteristic. What I feel about matter is only a creation of my mind. Cinema, Radio

and Television—these three modern discoveries also demonstrate that our knowledge about matter might be entirely due to transformation of electrical energy.

An uneducated man (to quote Eddington again) sometimes makes the mistake that the telegrams we receive contain writings by the hand of the person sending the message. We are making similar mistakes every moment. We think that shape, substance, taste and smell are all adherent to matter. But in reality, there is nothing besides electro-magnetic waves of different wave-lengths. Shape, mass, taste and smell do not adhere to these waves. We think (very wrongly) that a sweet taste adheres to an orange. Why then not say that the sense of pain also adheres to the needle with which the doctor puts some injection in the arm ?

Speaking of taste, colour, smell etc., we use these words in two different senses. In the first place, we mean the feelings underlying these sensations. In the second place, we mean the energy which incites these sensations. The first is a product of my mind, and the second is outside me in the form of energy. Hence, outside my mind, if there is anything real in the Universe, it is only energy in some form or another. Modern science thus practically

confirms the conclusion arrived at by the Sāmkhya Philosophy.

Part II : Two Fundamental Considerations in Understanding the Sāmkhya Philosophy

According to the Sāmkhya system, there are in all three categories of objects (Padārtha), namely, the Vyakta (Manifest), the Avyakta (Unmanifest) and the Puruṣa (the Soul). The Puruṣa is, however, included in the Avyakta¹.

Hence ultimately we have only two categories, namely, the Vyakta and the Avyakta.

The Vyakta comprises the entire Universe, everything contained in it, whether it is perceived or only inferred. The Avyakta in the Sāmkhya Philosophy indicates the Ultimate Cause which

¹ According to Vācaspati, we may describe the Puruṣa as having the characteristics of the Vyakta though it is itself Avyakta. The Puruṣa, that is the individual soul, is the seer, but is without attributes or activity and is conscious. According to Verse no. X, the individual souls would, therefore, be Avyakta, but because they are many, they would have the characteristics of the Vyakta as well. Prakṛti is Avyakta when she is inactive, that is, when the Guṇas are in equilibrium, but when the guṇas are differentiated, she is active and hence Vyakta.

It will be easy to understand the Sāmkhya Philosophy if by Vyakta and Avyakta we mean the manifested and the unmanifested states respectively.

itself has no cause, the *causa causans*. The adherents of the Sāṃkhya system hold that there can be no effect without cause. There must be a cause behind the Vyakta, and evidently this cause will have another, and the second cause will have a third one, and so on. But there must be an ultimate cause which itself is uncaused, otherwise there would be no end of the chain of causal relation. The Avyakta is thus the ultimate cause of the creation (Kārikā XV). Sāṃkhya's Avyakta thus corresponds to Brahman of the Vedānta (*vide* Gauḍapāda on Verse no. XXII).

Hence Avyakta is Cause, while Vyakta is the Effect. Again, Avyakta is without cause (Ahetumat), and Vyakta caused (Hetumat).

By reasonable inference, it follows that whatever is without cause must be infinite, endless, indivisible, one, inconceivable, inactive, and immanent in everything else. It cannot be otherwise. This is what has been indicated in Verse no. X. For similar reasons, it will be seen that whatever is caused must have characters opposite to those of the Avyakta and that it must be included in and pervaded by the Avyakta. Its existence itself would be dependent on Avyakta. This antithesis between cause and effect has been explained in Kārikā XIV to which I shall presently refer.

An effect always remains latent in its cause and in proper time it is revealed by the activity of the Cosmic power. This separation of the effect from the cause in which it was latent is called creation (Sarga) in the Sāṁkhya philosophy. The Cosmic power or the primeval energy with its three modes of action which brings about this separation is called the Prakṛti.

The activity of the Guṇas, that is, their transformation, has no respite. Just as a clock when set in motion goes on by itself, so also once the Guṇas commence to act, they continue to do so indefinitely according to fixed laws until the final object is reached. In the Sāṁkhya philosophy, twenty-three separate stages of such transformation have been described, so that the process of the transformation may be properly understood. These stages are Mahat-tattva, Ahamkāra-tattva etc. (*vide* Verse no. III).

As soon as the Guṇas¹ are in action, *i.e.*, as soon as creation begins, along with the Prakṛti, Purusas (or rather the Puruṣa) also become manifest. At the earliest stage, the

¹ It is stated in Verse no. XI that the activity of the Primeval Energy, is three-fold—three Guṇas, Sattva, Rajas and Tamas. Activity is the same thing as the three well-known “Modes of action of Nature” (Newton’s Three Laws of Motion).

Puruṣa is in a state which may be described as a trance or stupefaction. The Puruṣa is stupefied, as it were, by the wiles of Prakṛti, in the words of Gauḍapāda on Verse no. XL. At this stage, the Puruṣa remains latent in the Prakṛti. Strictly speaking, there is no sense in saying that the Puruṣa remains latent in the Prakṛti, but I am forced to use this expression for want of a better one. At this stage in the process of creation there was neither time nor space, and so how can we think of two different things existing independently at that stage? The concept of individuality is dependent on the concept of space. We are unable to think or express ourselves without recourse to the concepts of time and space. For this reason I was compelled to say that the Puruṣas (Puruṣas in the aggregate) were then latent in the Prakṛti. At the same time it is not correct to refer to Puruṣas in the plural. There can be no idea of separateness or plurality in the absence of the concept of space. The mind in the absence of the concept of space cannot comprehend distinction. No human language can express this pre-Creation stage of the Universe. The individual souls (Puruṣas) are not separate or distinct from one another at this stage. Puruṣas in the aggregate and the Prakṛti remain in a

state of coalescence. This stage is designated the Mahat-tattva in the Sāṃkhya Philosophy. This is the consciousness of the Collective Ego.

This is the state of affairs also at the stage of the Final Destruction of the Universe. The Mahat-tattva of the Sāṃkhya has been termed Hiranyagarbha and Virāt-puruṣa in the Purāṇas.

The Sāṃkhya philosophers have no objection to the terms Hiranyagarbha and Virāt-puruṣa. All that they insist on is that just before creation everything in the Universe, animate or inanimate, is in the Mahat-tattva in an inchoate state, collectively, without any sort of individuality. On creation, all these become manifest in different forms. This receives confirmation in modern science also. Thus Jeans says in his *Physics and Philosophy*, p. 204 :

“The new quantum mechanics may perhaps give a hint. In each case space and time are inhabited by different individuals ; but when we pass beyond space and time,—from the world of phenomena to reality,—individuality is replaced by community.... So it may be with Life. The phenomena may be individuals carrying on separate existence in space and time, while in the deeper reality beyond space and time, we may all be members of one body.”

This statement of Jeans cannot be lightly brushed aside. What he has stated can be appreciated if we keep in mind the findings of Wave-Mechanics. Eddington in his *Philosophy of Physical Science*, Chapter X, has briefly indicated the arguments. (Compare in this connection the *Gītā*, VIII, 18.)

The stage 'subsequent' to the Mahat-tattva is termed Ahamkāra-tattva in Sāṃkhya philosophy. The word 'subsequent' no doubt implies an idea of time which was non-existent at this stage, but there is no way out. At this stage we have for the first time the idea of individuality in Puruṣas who were so far, as it were, in a trance in the Prakṛti. An idea of separate individual existence succeeds the Collective Ego. This idea of individuality is at the root of the concepts of Space and Time. 'I am an individual (Puruṣa)' implies two concepts, namely, (1) first, that 'I am', i.e., 'I always exist'—this leads to the concept of Time; and (2) secondly, 'I am different from others'—which leads to the concept of Space.

Necessarily, the idea that 'I am different' leads to the consciousness of the existence of other puruṣas. Clearly, concept of Space means an idea of externality. There can be no concept of Space in the absence of an external object. (*vide* Pañcadaśī, 2, 42-45). But this is not a

tenet of our śāstras alone. It is the conclusion of the modern Relativity Theory also. Thus, Jeans says, 'For Einstein, Space cannot *exist without objects.*' 'You cannot have space without things or things without space.' (Whitehead) When the Jīva or the Individual Soul is in the Ahamkāra-tattva, the concepts of both Time and Space arise. These two concepts are at the root of all knowledge. Without the underlying concept of Space and Time, it is not possible to understand anything, to think, or speak of anything. At the same time, it is not possible to separate the concept of Time from that of Space. One is a part of the other and includes it. (See notes on Kārikā XXXIII.)

The next stage of Creation is dichotomous. On the one hand, from the Ahamkāra-tattva evolves the Sense-Organ (Indriyas) and the Mind (Antahkaraṇa), and on the other hand, the Tanmātras. That is to say, at this stage of creation, the energy of the three Guṇas of Prakṛti bifurcates into two forms, one very subtle and the other gross. The subtler energy creates the sense-world (Bhāvākhyā sargah). The gross energy, which has been called here the Tanmātras, constitutes the entire physical universe which Sāmkhya calls Līmgākhyā or Tanmātra sargah (*vide* Kārikā LII).

The Purāṇas say that energy in the form of Tanmātras evolved from the ego-sense of the Virāṭ-Puruṣa. The idea was no doubt taken from the above cosmology of the Sāṃkhya Philosophy. According to Sāṃkhya, therefore, thoughts and emotions of the sense-world, and gross energy (Tanmātras) of the physical world, are in substance one and the same thing, having emanated from the same source. They are, therefore, mutually convertible. We can convert thought into energy or energy into thought, just as we can convert light into electricity, and *vice versa*.¹

The Tanmātra derives its name from the fact that it is the smallest fraction of the primordial energy of Prakṛti (the Guṇas collectively).²

Thus, according to Sāṃkhya, energy acts in quanta.

All material objects we see around us are composed of Tanmātras alone. Matter is an assemblage of Tapmātras only.

Matter exists in five states, *viz.*—

1. Solid (Kṣiti)
2. Liquid (Āpah)

¹ “गृह्णोः क्रिया तसो वोधः पुनर्बीधस्य शक्तिता ।”

—*Yoga Kārikā*, Hariharānanda Āraṇya.

² तत् + मात्र = तमात्र । गुणसे वातिसूचारूपेनावस्थानं तमात्रशब्दे नीचते ।

3. Luminous (Tejas)
4. Gaseous (Vāyu)
5. Space (Ākāśa)

These states are called the five Mahābhūtas.

The same matter may exist in all these five states : e.g., a piece of lead is solid at first, when heated it becomes liquid, further heated it becomes red-hot, further heated it becomes a gas and finally it disappears into empty space as Tanmātras (electrons).

Part III : The Sāṁkhyā Philosophy is not atheistic.

The Sāṁkhyā Philosophy is a system based on reason. But such reason is not transcendental reason as in the Vedānta. It is just common sense. It is with such reason that the Sāṁkhyā system has thought out the real nature of the Universe and of the Soul. The basic reasoning of the system is incorporated in Verses Nos. X, XI and XIV. In order to understand the philosophy of the Sāṁkhyā system, we have to depend on the reasoning put forward in the system itself and not on the dialectics obtaining in other systems of philosophy. The Sāṁkhyā philosophy has been misrepresented by many because they failed to keep this fact in view.

At the very outset, it is important to understand Verses No. X and XI which deal with

the difference between the Avyakta and the Vyakta, that is, between the Unmanifested and the Manifested. I have shown that the Manifested in the Sāṃkhya Philosophy means the entire physical Universe whether it is perceived or merely inferred. Whatever is beyond this is the Unmanifested, the Avyakta. In the words of Science, the Vyakta would mean the Four-dimensional Space-Time Continuum or the phenomenal world and everything it contains, and Avyakta, the Reality above Space-Time.

We are to keep in mind that beyond the physical universe there is neither Time nor Space. Time and Space are inseparably connected with matter, which, again, can exist only in Time and Space. As pointed out above, the characteristics of the Avyakta are just the opposite of those of the Vyakta. Why this should be so has been discussed in Verse No. XIV. It is said that all this is due to the display of the three Modes of action of Nature, *viz.* the three Guṇas. It is the Guṇas that make all the distinction between a Vyakta and the Avyakta.

Now, I become conscious of an object only when some energy coming from it impinges on my sense-organs. This is what is taught by modern Science and this also is Sāṃkhya's own psychology (Kārikā XXVIII).

Thus, according to Sāṃkhya, objects are

visible and knowable and are subject-matters of our senses only because they can transmit energy, without which there will be nothing to distinguish them from the Avyakta.¹

We thus find in Kārikā No. XIV (read with Kārikā No. X) yet another distinction between the Vyakta and the Avyakta. Vyakta is active (Sakriya) and therefore non-conscious (Acetana), being subject-matters of our sensations, while the Avyakta is without ‘action’ (Niskriya) and therefore not an object to be seen and for the reason of that it is the conscious Seer itself. The idea is that in this world everything can be classified either as the seer or the seen, the enjoyer or the enjoyed, manifested or the unmanifested, conscious or non-conscious; so, if anything is not the one, it must be the other.

This then is the distinction drawn by the Sāmkhya between the Conscious (Cetana) and the Non-conscious (Acetana). This distinction is difficult to understand not only for the ordinary man but also for the learned. This is only natural, because our experience tells us that it is only the animate conscious beings which are

¹ It may be remembered that in modern science objects are so many bubbles of “bottled-up energy” (to borrow a term from Jeans) floating in empty space, like soap-bubbles in the sky.

active and which can move about. We consider only such things as non-conscious which are inactive and which cannot move by themselves. But our experience is now contradicted by the Sāṃkhya. According to the Sāṃkhya, whatever is inactive is conscious and everything which is active is non-conscious. But Science now supports Sāṃkhya because everything in this world is in a state of motion due to its inherent energy. The Sāṃkhya propounded and Science proved that there is a constant movement inside all the atoms constituting the Universe. The Guṇas are, by their very nature, ever transforming themselves and there is no cessation of this transformation. We also know that what is matter is nothing but a three-fold activity of energy, Sattva, Rajas and Tamas (or mass, momentum and stress). It is a common experience that everything in this world suffers change and, ultimately, destruction. How can there be any change in the absence of inherent activity? How can there be destruction? There is nothing in this world which is inactive and it is not even possible to imagine anything which is completely so.

But beyond the phenomenal world, there is no play of energy. Hence it is quite possible that in the Avyakta stage there may be something inactive but it must be remembered

that that something will be beyond Space and Time also, and for the reason of that it must be an undivided homogeneous "One" single existence.

At the very outset, therefore, Sāṁkhyā (Verse X) propounded that the Avyakta which is causeless is always one, and always inactive. Since it is inactive, the One is eternal; for there can be no change or destruction without some sort of activity. According to the reasoning made out in the verse just referred to, this One is all-pervading, independent, indivisible and so on. It is inactive and hence invisible, not being an object of perception or sight—it is the Seer itself.

This conclusion of the Sāṁkhyā fits in with the finding of modern science that in this subjective world of ours the only objective element is Consciousness and Consciousness alone.

So proceeding on the basis of what may be called just common sense, the Sāṁkhyā has reached the conclusion that beyond the Universe, there is one 'thing' (Padārtha) which is eternal and all-pervading. That one 'thing' is inactive, conscious and is the Seer, i.e., Consciousness itself.

For such reasons, Gaudapāda identified the Avyakta of the Sāṁkhyā with the Brahman of

the Vedas. It would thus follow that the conclusions of both these systems are fundamentally the same.

My friend Manorañjana Śāstrī has also shown that at first it was held that there was no fundamental difference between the Sāṃkhya and the Vedānta. He writes : "In ancient times, the Sāṃkhya philosophy and the Vedānta formed one system and were interdependent. In Narasiṁha Svāmin's Sāṃkhya-taru-vasantah, a commentary on the Sāṃkhya Kārikā, it was shown that there was fundamentally no difference between the Sāṃkhya and the Vedānta."

Later commentators, however, lost sight of all these considerations and they identified Avyakta with Prakṛti. According to these commentators, the Prakṛti is *always* unmanifested, Avyakta, and *always* non-conscious. They explain Verse XV to mean that the non-conscious Prakṛti is the ultimate cause of the Universe. So they draw the necessary inference that because the ultimate cause of the Universe is non-conscious, the Sāṃkhya philosophy must be atheistic.

Those commentators do not admit that the Avyakta cannot but be conscious as has been shown earlier. Even if we can conceive of a separate existence of the Prakṛti at the Avyakta stage, even then the said Prakṛti must

be conscious. In the Tantras, that Prakṛti has been named the Primeval Prakṛti or Mahāmāyā and it has been shown that there is no difference between Śiva and Śakti, and that the two are fundamentally identical.¹

Why the commentators explained Verse No. XV in this way I cannot comprehend. In Verse XXI it has been clearly stated that the ultimate cause of the Universe is neither the

¹ If Verse X is explained correctly, Prakṛti cannot be understood as Avyakta, because Avyakta of the Sāṁkhya is inactive, unchanging, real and causeless. Though Prakṛti is so before the creation, she is active and always changing from the beginning of the creation up to its end. Prakṛti as such has never been termed Avyakta in the Sāṁkhya. In Kārikā XI, Sāṁkhya has distinctly stated that this Prakṛti or *Pradhāna* has all the attributes of the Vyakta. The word Avyakta occurs in the Kārikās only five times, namely, in the Verses II, X, XIV, XV and LVIII. In every place Avyakta means the the *state* before creation, that is, the *state* when the Puruṣa and the Prakṛti are united together in one entity.

Gauḍapāda, an Advaitin (monist), was fully conscious of this, but still he used the word Prakṛti to mean the Avyakta in Kārikā LVIII. But he was careful to state that Prakṛti, Pradhāna, Māyā, Avyakta and Brahman, all mean the same thing (*vide* Verse XXI).

The later commentators did not identify Avyakta with the Brahman of the Vedānta. They left out the Brahman altogether and identified Prakṛti alone with the Avyakta.

Puruṣa alone nor the Prakṛti alone. Creation is due to the union of the two. The matter is made quite clear by the Gitā (Chapter XIV, 8). Vācaspati himself states that the union of Prakṛti and Puruṣa is without beginning and end and that the creation of the Universe is due to this union. This state of union is the Avyakta stage—in this union it is not possible to point out the Puruṣa or the Prakṛti as an individual entity. Avyakta evidently refers to the state before the creation. Again, in Verse III and XVII as well as in Verse XI, it has been clearly stated that Avyakta is the Puruṣa.

Then again, all the commentators agree that the Yoga system of Patañjali is theistic. But it is well known that as regards creation there is no difference whatsoever between the two systems (*vide* my Vedānta Darśana, pp. 114-116). Then, how is it that the Sāṃkhya system is considered atheistic while the Yoga system is admitted to be theistic? The learned commentators have not given any convincing reason.

In the Pātañjala system the word Īśvara has been used once, but the word has not been used in the Sāṃkhya. This is the only difference between the two schools. Patañjali merely states that if we concentrate our mind on a

'particular person' (*Puruṣa-višeṣa*) called Īśvara, our mind would thereby become 'fixed'. But in this philosophy there is nothing to show that this 'particular person' had anything to do with the creation of the Universe. As a matter of fact, there could be no Īśvara with attributes (*Saguṇa*) before the creation and none at the time of the Final Destruction.

Saguṇa Īśvara, that is, Īśvara with attributes, is only a *Puruṣa* subject to the *Māyā* of the *Prakṛti*, like ourselves. The only difference is that we are powerless under the influence of the *Māyā*, while Īśvara is not (*vide* my *Gītā*, second edition, p. 112).

According to the *Vedānta* also Qualified (*Saguṇa*) Īśvara had no hand in the matter of creation. The entire creation is merely a thought of the Unqualified (*Nirguṇa*) Brahman.

Again, it should be noted, that the Sāṃkhya uses three words, more or less of identical import, *viz.*—*Jñā*, *Pumān* and *Puruṣa*. *Jñā* means Ātman or Pure Consciousness. According to the Sāṃkhya *Jñā*, *Pumān*, *Puruṣa*—all mean the all-pervading Consciousness, and all are *Avyakta* (unmanifested). *Gauḍapāda*, the uncompromising monist, at once identified *Pumān* with Brahman and *Puruṣa* with the Seer, the *Jīvātman*, and explained that according to the Sāṃkhya there is no distinction between the *Jīvātman* and the

Paramātman (Brahman). Other commentators have not discussed this important question. Had they entered into the question, they would have had to face the query—"How can the non-conscious Prakṛti be the ultimate cause of the Universe, if it is admitted that an all-pervading Consciousness (Cit-śakti) existed everywhere?"

There is another point to note. It is not clear what the commentators understood by the word Guṇa.

It is generally admitted that in the manifested matter there is nothing besides the three Guṇas. It is also admitted that the Guṇas are the only workers of all changes or transformation in the world.

Colebrooke explained the Guṇas as the "three constituent elements" and, up to the present, his explanation has held the field in the universities. But what are those constituent elements?

Sāṃkhya has divided all the constituents of the world into 24 categories (the 24 tattvas) and there cannot be any other "constituent elements" besides these.

Moreover, now that we know that words like 'elements', 'substance' or 'matter' have disappeared from modern Physics never again to return, it is high time that Colebrooke's

definition of the word Guṇa should be revised. It cannot be accepted without further elucidation.

It has been suggested by some that objects being nothing more than an assemblage of their primary qualities, the Guṇas of the Sāṃkhya philosophy must be held to be identical with those qualities, *viz.* pleasure, pain and indifference.

This idea is also contradicted by modern Psychology which has abolished all primary and secondary qualities of matter and reduced them to mere ideas of the mind as explained in Part I of the Introduction. Moreover, it is difficult to understand how the qualities which have no objective existence, apart from a human mind, could be the cause of all the changes and transformations in the Physical world.

Sāṃkhya itself says in Kārikā XXXVIII that the Tanmātras (*i.e.*, the smallest divisible fractions of the Guṇas) give rise to pleasure, pain or indifference in a human mind. This is quite in accordance with the teachings of modern Psychology. Thus it seems to me that we have not as yet got any clear idea of the meaning in which the word Guṇa has been used in the Sāṃkhya philosophy. The only plausible explanation of the term, so far as I know, has been given by Śrī Aurobindo who

thinks that Guṇas are the “three essential modes of action of Nature” (corresponding, no doubt, to the Three Laws of Motion of Newton’s dynamics).

If we accept this definition, the whole Sāṃkhya Philosophy becomes easy to understand ; not only so, but one will be surprised to find how most of its truths have now been experimentally verified by modern science.

But, thirty years ago, all this was not known and so it is not to be wondered at that many considered the Sāṃkhya Philosophy to be a system devoid of meaning. This is how Sāṃkhya Philosophy became to many not only meaningless but also atheistic.

Whatever defects there might be in this system, it is neither meaningless nor atheistic. The system has successfully come out in this matter from the searching criticism of the sage Bādarāyaṇa. The sage criticized the Sāṃkhya system in four places in his Sūtras, but nowhere has he even suggested that the Sāṃkhya Philosophy is either meaningless or atheistic. Śaṅkarācārya has also levelled severe criticism against the system, but even he has not said a word to the effect that the Sāṃkhya Philosophy is either meaningless or atheistic. He fully realized that if the Sāṃkhya be atheistic, he would himself be so. Neither Śaṅkarācārya

nor Kapila was an atheist; both were Supertheists.

After bitterly criticizing the Sāṃkhya and the Yoga systems, Śaṅkarācārya reaches this conclusion : "The Sāṃkhya and the Yoga systems are both well-known to be the means of realizing the ultimate object of man, that is salvation. Sāṃkhya means knowledge and Yoga, concentration. Brahman can be realized by knowledge and concentration. This is admitted by the Upaniṣads. I must admit those portions of the Sāṃkhya and the Yoga which are not opposed to the Śrutis. The Puruṣa of the Sāṃkhya is Nirguṇa. I unreservedly accept this. I also accept the instructions offered by the Yoga regarding Śama, Dama etc." (*vide* Śaṅkara on Brahmasūtra, II, 1, 3).

But is there anything in the Sāṃkhya which is opposed to the Śrutis? Is there any real challenge of the Sāṃkhya system in the Brahmasūtras? I have answered these questions in many places of my Vedānta Darśana.

The Vedānta does not admit the objectivity of the Prakṛti. As a matter of fact modern science also does not admit the objectivity of Energy.

Energy, which is identical with the Prakṛti of the Sāṃkhya, is, according to modern science, only a mental concept. Vedānta says exactly

the same thing. In Vedānta, the Prakṛti of the Sāṃkhya has been termed “Anumāna”, that is what is only inferred.

In Brahmasūtra I, 1, 5, Prakṛti is termed Aśabdām ; this means that there is no mention of Prakṛti in the Śrutis. This is the first reference of the Sāṃkhya system in the Brahmasūtras.

The second reference is in Sūtras I, 4, 1-12. Here all the Upaniṣads were critically considered but nowhere was any reference to the Prakṛti of the Sāṃkhya found. It is concluded that though there is a seeming reference to Prakṛti of the Sāṃkhya in three places, actually the reference was to something else.

The third reference to the Sāṃkhya system is in Sūtras II, 1, 1-3. Here also it is stated that there is no mention of the Prakṛti of the Sāṃkhya as a separate identity in any Smṛti, such as the Manu Saṃhitā.

The Brahmasūtras have referred to the Sāṃkhya system for the fourth and the last time in II, 2, 1-10. Here the underlying reasoning of the Sāṃkhya Philosophy in support of its principal tenets have been discussed. We find in the Brahmasūtras themselves that according to the Sāṃkhya the world is a creation of Nature and that everything in this world happens according to natural laws which

regulate every detail. The Brahmasūtras do not raise any objection against this, neither is it stated that the reasonings of the Sāṃkhya Philosophy are in any manner defective. It is only stated there that it is not necessary to admit an unreal category like the non-conscious Prakṛti, for everything in this phenomenal world happens as it is ordained in the 'mind' of the Brahman.

Everything is verily the Brahman. This is enough to explain everything. According to the Vedānta itself, the Prakṛti of Sāṃkhya is the Māyā, the quintessence of the incomprehensible power of the Brahman which effects the creation.

All this can be comprehended and this is also what the Sāṃkhya propounds. In Kārikā No. LXI it is clearly stated that Prakṛti is the *Phenomenal Cause* of the Universe (*vide* my analysis of the Kārikā). In Kārikā XLVIII it has been distinctly said that to regard Prakṛti as the ultimate reality is a sort of ignorance (Avidyā).

But to understand all this we have first to assume that the Prakṛti is real and then gradually proceed on the basis of that assumption. This is the only way in which we can discuss the matter scientifically. It is on the basis of Newton's materialistic physics that Einstein

succeeded in raising the structure of his idealistic theory. It is only recently that the scientists have realized that even Energy has no real existence. Mere uttering of the Vedāntic aphorism that "All is Brahman" will only benefit those who have the equipment mentioned in the Introduction to the Brahma-Sūtra. For others, it will only impede their spiritual progress. For, as it is said :

अज्ञेयार्द्धप्रवृद्धस्य सर्वं ब्रह्मेति यो वदेत् ।
महानिरयजालेषु स तेन विनियोजितः ॥

This is so because the human mind is so constituted that it cannot comprehend anything which does not fit in with his own sense-world, viz. with his wordly experience and his pre-dispositions. It is for this reason that Philosophy, Logic, Mathematics and all the other sciences are necessary in order to realize the Ultimate Reality of which the Vedānta speaks. But Vedānta is not a Philosophy at all : It is a super-Philosophy where there is no room for any scientific discussion or arguments without which the ordinary human mind will not be convinced.

For this reason the Sāṃkhya has strictly followed the scientific method of investigation and has proceeded on the assumption that Prakṛti is real — for, without assuming the

objectivity of space, time and energy, no scientific discussion is possible.

If the Sāṁkhya philosophy is explained on the basis of common sense, there arises no difficulty whatsoever. But instead of doing so if we proceed on the assumption that the Sāṁkhya is atheistic, it would never be possible to get at the real intention sought to be conveyed by the author. It would lead to useless controversy and of such controversy there will be no end.

Part IV : Sāṁkhya's Idea of Creation.

"We can reasonably infer", says Gauḍapāda (Kārikā VI), "that the Puruṣa guides Prakṛti in all her actions, otherwise, she being inanimate could not create a World."

Later on, quoting from the ancient text (Ṣaṣṭi Tantra) he said, "पुरुषाविष्टितं प्रधानं प्रवर्तते", i.e., Prakṛti, only when organized by the intelligent Puruṣa can be effective.

From such statements, however, it will be quite wrong for the reader to imagine that all acts of Prakṛti and all her transformations are, according to Sāṁkhya, really the work of God. Sāṁkhya does not say so. It actually contradicts the idea.

I do not say that it will be far too wrong

to suppose that everything is ordained by God and that not a leaf can fall against His will. I say, on the other hand, that a man who has realized this great truth has no need to read any philosophy at all ; he has understood all ; he has understood that Prakṛti is in reality the will of God. So says the Vedānta and so says the Gītā also.

For such a man who has realized the Self the Sāṃkhya philosophy has not been written. It has been written for ignorant people with a view to lead them step by step from gross matters to subtler things until they can understand what the Soul is.

Sāṃkhya, therefore, begins with gross matters and goes slowly up until it reaches the three great Modes of action of Nature. It shows how the whole creation is the work of Nature—a transformation of the three Guṇas from a highly organized state to a completely disorganized one. Thus its method of treatment of the subject, and its conclusions also, are the same as those of Modern Science. Here, in its philosophy, we find the Quantum Theory, the Relativity Theory, the Second Law of Thermodynamics, the Theory of Space-Time and all such things.

The only thing we do not find is God Himself.

By this, however, the reader is not to infer that the Sāṃkhya is an atheistic philosophy. Its main point is that the Avyakta Brahman is Static and is not the doer of any action.

This idea of creation helps a man in the path of God-realization. It makes it easy for him to realize (1) that the Soul is inactive and is a mere Seer (Kārikā XIX); (2) that there is no difference between the Soul and the Brahman—both being the same eternal and all-pervading Consciousness Itself; (3) that the man is not a doer of his action—the three great Modes of action of Prakṛti work through him. (Kārikā XIX, or Gītā, III, 5)

Lest we should forget these three great truths, so essential for self-realization, Gaudapāda has been reminding us from time to time that nothing in Nature is done by God and that all transformations of Prakṛti are of her own making. (See his notes on Kārikās XXXI, XXVII and LXI.)

The crux of the whole philosophy of Sāṃkhya lies in the above cryptic passage quoted by Gaudapāda from the Śaṣṭi Tantra which is believed to be the original text from which the Kārikās of Iśvarakṛṣṇa derive their authority. The clear meaning of this passage, as I said above, is that Energy cannot do any work unless an intelligent man directs it into

a proper channel. This is a great scientific truth and is a matter of our everyday experience. We know that energy not so directed can only dissipate itself, and if it can create anything, it can create only a chaos but never an orderly cosmos. Then again, in his exposition of Kārikā XXVII, Gauḍapāda has shown how the Guṇas, when organized, can work like an intelligent person with caution and pre-thought. Now that we have got so many man-made machines which work like intelligent persons, e.g., "the Electric Secretary", the "Robot Soldier", the "Robot Doctor" and the like, we require no further confirmation of what Gauḍapāda says.

Furthermore, in Kārikā XLII, it is said that Prakṛti has a wonderful power to do all things by her Vibhūti Yoga.

Verily, the Vibhūti Yoga of Prakṛti means that no "action" can be done without application of energy and at the same time there is nothing in the world which an intelligent man cannot do with properly organized energy. This statement requires no verification when we consider that by means of properly organized energy, even human scientists are now about to break earthly bonds and conquer space with their rockets. There is every prospect of their being able to do more.

According to Sāṃkhya, therefore, this universe is a vast organization of the Avyakta Brahman, in which every action, every event in space-time including our birth, death and rebirth, is a continuous natural process carried on by Prakṛti with her three Guṇas, and Brahman only devised the organization once for all and did nothing more. In its discussion in Kārikā XVII, Sāṃkhya has made it clear that although the Avyakta Puruṣa has thus completely concealed himself from our view, his presence can easily be felt in the inevitable law and order that prevail all over the universe.

This is also Vedānta's own idea. For, according to Vedānta, Brahman is Nirguṇa (static). The universe evolved out of a thought of His and all subsequent events in space-time are the work of His Māyā (Prakṛti).

Thus, one Upaniṣad actually says that though, according to sages who know, the whole creation is an act of Nature, yet its ultimate cause is Brahman." (Śvetāśvatara, VI, 1)

Part V: The Three Guṇas.

When a ray of sodium light strikes the retina, the light energy is transformed into the energy of an electrical impulse which passes along the optic nerves to the cerebral centres.

There it gives our mind the impression of the yellow colour and this impression is stored for ever in our "sub-conscious mind" as a thought of the yellow.¹

We can recall the thought afterwards to our consciousness when we want, or it appears by itself to us in our dreams, when it becomes a living thought; otherwise it lies stored in the sub-conscious mind with many other such thoughts of which we are not aware at all.

We know no more at present about the nature of our thoughts. Recently, however, Bio-chemists of America are beginning to make extensive researches about the nature of thoughts by studying the electric eels which abound in that country. These electric eels, it has been found, can stun or kill their prey from a distance by discharging electricity from their bodies. This gives a cue to the scientists for discovering how thoughts arise and how impulses are translated into action. If the experiment proves successful, it may lend support to what the ancient thinkers of India said about the nature of thoughts thousands of years ago.

I have said before that according to the

¹ The sub-conscious mind of the new psychology of modern science is the same as the "Samskāra" of Indian philosophy.

Sāmkhya Philosophy thoughts and energy are only two forms of the same thing. Energy gives rise to thoughts and thoughts become energy when they come out from the mind. That is how Yogīs are said to be possessed of power to do wonderful things merely by thinking. The only difference between thoughts and energy, as I said before, is that thoughts are very subtle energy (*i.e.*, in modern language, vibrations of very high frequencies) which our sense-organs cannot receive, while gross energy which strikes our sense-organs are vibrations of lower frequencies.

Both being the same energy, it follows that their activity must be governed by the same laws.

We know from dynamics that in the physical world activity of energy is governed by three well known laws to which I referred above as Newton's Three Laws of Motion. In classical Physics, they are called inertia, acceleration and reaction, and in modern Physics, mass (or energy), momentum and stress.

It is difficult to explain to a layman what mass, or momentum, or stress mean, although the meaning of the terms is crystal-clear to a scientist who knows how Nature works. Sāmkhya has explained how the same three-fold activity of Nature exists also in the sense world.

Thus says Śrī Aurobindo : "The idea of the three essential Modes of Nature is a creation of the ancient Indian thinkers and its truth is not at once obvious because it was the result of long psychological experiment and profound internal experience.... These Modes are termed in Indian books Qualities (*Gunas*), and were given the names—Sattva, Rajas and Tamas.... Ordinarily used for psychological self-analysis, these distinctions are valid also in physical Nature." (*Essays on the Gītā*)

The terms Sattva, Rajas and Tamas which apply equally to the action of energy and thoughts, will perhaps be better understood if we first look into our own mind :

1. When our mind is in its normal state of rest or tranquillity, we feel pleasure or delight. This condition of the mind, along with the pleasure or the delight, has been brought about by thought-waves moving in a certain way. We call this action of thoughts Sattva *Guṇa*. It corresponds to "Inertia" of the Physical world. Inertia does not mean inertness, but it is an effort of a moving body to remain in its own state of rest or motion.

2. When, again, thoughts are in motion, i.e., when too many thoughts enter our mind,

there is agitation and this is painful. We call this action Rajas—equivalent to Newton's "Acceleration".

3. Then, again, when dark thoughts, e.g., violent anger or lust, enter into our mind, they bring about a retardation of the normal functions of the mind. In the physical world such action of energy would be called "Reaction" (Newton's Third Law of Motion). Sāṃkhya called such action Tamas. This gives rise to ignorance (Moha) of all sorts.

When applied to the material world of Physics, the functions of these three Guṇas are as follow :

1. Sattva illumines moving bodies in their true position (*Prakāśa*).

2. Rajas is "Action" (using the word "Action" in its scientific sense) which brings about change or destruction. It is thus active (*Pravṛtti*).

3. Tamas is "Retardation of Action" (*Niyama*).

These Guṇas being only three modes of action of the same energy cannot be thought of separately. Whenever there is any action in the world, all the three Guṇas are there working together in harmony, only one Guṇa working at a time and the other two helping the first (Kārikās XII and XIII).

As an illustration, let us consider how a tree grows :

It grows by the action of the Rajas (acceleration). But if this were all, it would go on growing for ever and there would be no limit to its growth and it will grow to its full height in no time. This is not how a tree grows.

What actually happens is that when it grows a little, Sattva Guṇa comes into play, for its tendency is to keep a body in its own state of motion or rest. Then Tamas comes to the aid of Sattva and both of them acting together retard the growth for a moment. But as soon as retardation starts, Sattva Guṇa acting with Rajas overcomes the retardation, and the tree again begins to grow and again it is checked, and so on. These processes of acceleration and retardation follow in quick succession and the tree grows slowly but surely. This is how Nature works.¹

¹ In passing, I may point out that according to Sāṃkhya, thought being only a form of energy is as inanimate (*Acetana*) as any other material object. The reservoir of all thoughts (*viz.* the Mind or, more correctly, the Buddhi) is also necessarily inanimate (*Acetana*). But it seems to be possessed of consciousness on account of its contact with the conscious *Puruṣa* (see *Kārikā XX*). In Western philosophy, thoughts and consciousness are

Part VI : Plurality of Soul.

This subject, *viz.* plurality of Soul (in Kārikā no. XVIII) has been seized upon and made a ground of attack against Sāṃkhya Philosophy by various commentators from the beginning of history.

But let us first see how Vedānta solved this important question.

According to the Monism of Vedānta also there is no difference between the Brahman and the Soul—the Soul being nothing but pure and indivisible consciousness itself.

The question then arose that if all Jīvas have only a common soul, how is it then that all of them do not behave in the same way, have not the same sort of cognition, do not do the same act and enjoy the same fruit, and so forth—in short, how is it, then, that the world is not as nonsensical as it should have been, if all men were to have one common soul ?

different aspects of the same thing, *viz.* of the same consciousness. (Eddington, *Philosophy of Physical Science*, pp. 202-205). This makes all the difference between Eastern and Western Psychology. Sāṃkhya's view helps a man whose object is self-realization. It makes it easy for him to differentiate the Buddhi from the Soul.

The matter was fully discussed in Chapter II, Part 3 of the Brahma-Sūtra and Saṃkarācārya solved the problem by saying that our perception is not at all a function of the functionless consciousness but it is a function of the Antahkaraṇa (Brahma-Sūtra, II, 3, 32) ; we see the world as our mind shows it.

His conclusion, as I have shown above, is supported by modern science, for, science also has proved by experiment that the world of Physics is a mental phenomenon.

Thus, Monism and Science have both agreed that the Physical universe is mental and therefore unreal ; the only difference being that science does not know why this world should be subjective or mental, while Monism says that it is so, because all men have a common soul.

This solution of Monism was not accepted by the other great teachers like Rāmānuja because, according to their old Psychology, mental perception was possible only in dreams. In the waking state, an object, in order to be seen, must really exist as an object before our eyes. They, therefore, contended that we are not living in a dream-world ; that we are, all of us, not dreaming the same dream at a time ; that the world must be real and that things must be what they are to our view.

Their solution of the above problem, therefore, was that the Jīva is not merely consciousness itself but he is consciousness enveloped in the 'Linga Śarīra', i.e., in the sensory equipment.¹

If we take this definition of a Jīva, then, of course, there is no doubt that the world is as we see it, and that it is absolutely real.

Here, the only drawback is that this conclusion is not supported by modern science, for science says, "To welter in a barren realism of the world, is a negation of all that physical science has accomplished in unravelling the complexity of sensory experience." (Eddington, *New Path-ways in Science*)

Now, returning to the Sāmkhya philosophy, it cannot accept the first solution, viz. the solution of Monism, for the obvious reason that Sāmkhya had begun its investigation by assuming that the world is real. It was only at the end of the investigation that we were told that we actually see the world as our mind (Buddhi) shows it. (See my notes under Kārikā XIX.) (This is exactly the procedure of science—to begin by taking things as they are and then arrive at the reality.)

¹ चैतन्यं यदविष्टं न लिङ्गदेहस्य यः पुनः ।
चिक्षाया लिङ्गदेहस्या तत् सहो जीव उच्यते ॥

Sāmkhya cannot accept the second solution, viz. that the Purusa (Jīva) is an assemblage of consciousness and 'Liṅga Sarīra', for it would cut at the very root of his philosophy, whose only object is to make God-realization easy for the ordinary man by discriminating the Soul from the 'Liṅga' from the very beginning.

Accordingly he said that for the purpose of his enquiry it was not necessary at that stage to know what the Soul really is—that being a matter which is under enquiry ; that, in the meantime, we could take things as they are, and accept the known fact that men behave differently, they all do not die at the same time, they have different sorts of cognition and so forth. We can, it went on to say, therefore take it that each man has a soul, without knowing the exact nature of the soul.

He could not have done better without admitting the world to be unreal.

Śrī Aurobindo has put the whole matter in a nutshell when he says :

"...but the infinite difference of view and outlook and attitude, action and experience—a difference not of the natural operations which are the same but of the witnessing consciousness—are utterly inexplicable except on the supposition that there is a multiplicity of witnesses, many Purusas :

...The only at all logical explanation from the point of view of Vedāntic Monism is that of the Māyāvāda, but there, the whole thing becomes a dream.... The more realistic Sāmkhya view of things does not admit this phantasmagoric idea of existence and therefore cannot adopt this solution." (*Essays on the Gītā*)

Part VII : Sāmkhya's Psychology.

I had had an occasion, a little while ago, to refer to the old Indian Psychology (which was also the Psychology of Europe) according to which energy emanating from the sense-organs goes to the object to be seen, seizes it and brings a picture of it which is presented to the mind. The mind reads the picture and then cognition ensues.

This old Psychology has now been discarded in Europe after a long series of controversy between the philosophers and the scientists there.¹

A very brief account of the Psychology

¹ It is highly interesting and more highly instructive to follow these controversies. The curious reader is referred to Miss Stebbing's *Philosophy and the Physicists*, and Eddington's *The New Path-ways in Science*.

has been given in Part I of this Introduction. It has now been firmly established by experiments that nothing goes out from our sense-organs. These organs possess no energy to transmit. They are merely apertures, as it were, through which energy emitted by the external objects enters into the cerebral centres.

I have already shown above that according to this new Psychology we are living as it were in a prison-house from which we see nothing of the external world except in so far as we receive some electro-magnetic vibrations which our mind turns into shapes, colours and attributes, thus making these appear as solid objects to our vision. Accordingly, if we see anything, we see the mind, and all the subsequent processes are only inferences made by the mind. Eddington says : "Mind is the first and the most direct thing in our experience ; all else is remote inference."

This new Psychology is exactly what the old Sāmkhya Philosophy teaches us. For, in Kārikā XXVIII, it has been clearly said that energy transmitted by the objects falls on our sense-organs and produce a sensation which is quite indeterminate and is without any form or attribute. Sāmkhya calls this sensation "Ālocana".

To this "Ālocana" the mind adds forms,

qualifications and attributes, and then only we can have cognition of the object.¹

Thus, according to Sāmkhya also, our knowledge of external objects is only a process of "mind-spinning" (a phrase from Eddington).

According to Sāmkhya also we see nothing but our mind (Buddhi). In Kārikā XIX, the Puruṣa has been defined as the Seer of the Buddhi. He sees the Buddhi and nothing else.

So far, therefore, Sāmkhya's psychology supports the new Psychology of Europe. But there is an important difference.

I have shown above that sensation and cognition are, both of them, functions of the Buddhi. Now, perception must surely be an act of consciousness. But, according to Sāmkhya, the Buddhi is an inanimate substance. How is it then that Buddhi can be both sentient and sapient?

This question does not arise in Western Philosophy because it holds that both sensation and perception constitute but one single process of activity of the same consciousness; in other words, it holds that thoughts are also conscious and so is the mind.

Sāmkhya cannot accept this view for

¹ See Kārikā XXVIII.

obvious reasons. According to it, thoughts also are inanimate objects, as I have said before.

According to Sāmkhya, the Buddhi is like a slate on which thoughts are being written from the time of the creation up till now. The writing on the slate is changing every moment due to new thoughts coming in and destroying or re-inforcing the old ones.

The final writing (or the shape of the Buddhi) at any given moment is what we are concerned with at that moment.

The final shape is called the Adhyavasāya of the Buddhi at that moment.¹

The Puruṣa sees this final shape of the Buddhi like a man seeing a photograph. It is actually a mental photograph of all the thoughts in the Buddhi for the time being. A photograph has no meaning until a man looks at it and assigns a meaning and then only it becomes a living picture.

In the same way when the Puruṣa looks at the Buddhi's shape, he understands it and the latter also receives an induced consciousness, as it were, and appears to behave like a

¹ अध्यवसायोऽसर्वैदं कर्त्तव्यमित्याकार निश्चयो दीपशिखैव बुद्धि परिणामावस्था विशेषः—सांख्यचन्द्रिका ।

बुद्धि तत्त्वा हि प्राकृतत्वात् अचेतनं । तदौयोऽध्यवसायोऽप्यचेतनम् । घटादिवत् ।... चितिच्छाया पत्या सा अचेतनापि ... चेतन इव भवति ... —तत्त्वकौमुदी ।

conscious being (See Kārikā XX). It is this Adhyavasāya of the Buddhi from which auto-suggestion for all actions is derived. The organs of action automatically act according to this auto-suggestion, as will be explained in Kārikās XXX and XXXI. To make the point clearer, it has been distinctly said in Kārikā XXXI that the organs discharge their respective functions automatically and neither God nor the Puruṣa works them. They are so organized that they act automatically.

KĀRIKĀS

I. दुःखव्याभिधाताज्ज्ञासा तदभिधातके हेतौ ।
दृष्टेसाऽपार्थी चेन्नैकान्तत्यन्ततोऽभावात् ॥ १ ॥

duḥkha-trayā-bhighātāj-
jjijñāsā tadabhighātake hetau ।
dr̥ṣṭe sā-pārthā cen-
nai-kāntā-'tyantato'-bhāvāt ॥

I. Being afflicted by three-fold affliction, man desires to enquire about a means to end it ; if you say that there are well-known ways to end affliction and so further enquiry is unnecessary, my reply is : "No, these ways are not certain and they cannot remove affliction finally and once for all."

Notes

1. Three-fold affliction :

- (i) Ādhyātmika—bodily or mental pain, e.g., disease, sorrow etc.
- (ii) Ādhikautika—affliction caused by acts of men and animals, e.g., snake-bite, bodily hurt etc.
- (iii) Ādhidaivika—affliction caused by acts of God or due to supernatural causes, e.g., death of relatives, death by lightning.

2. The known means to remove misery, e.g., treatment of a disease, are not only uncertain but also unable to remove the root cause of misery, so that the same misery may come again.

II. दृष्टवदानुश्रविकः स ह्यविशुद्धिक्षयातिशययुक्तः ।
 तद्विपरीतः श्रेयान् व्यक्ताव्यक्तज्ञविज्ञानात् ॥ २ ॥

dṛṣṭavad-ānuśravikah,
 sa hy-aviśuddhi-kṣayā'-tiśaya-yuktaḥ ।
 tadviparītah śreyān
 vyaktā-vyakta-jñā-vijñānāt ॥

II. The scriptural means to end misery is equally ineffective, because it is linked with impurity, its effect is neither lasting nor always the same for all. Different therefrom and superior thereto is the means to be obtained by an intimate knowledge of the Vyakta, the Avyakta and the Jñā.

Notes

1. The Śāstrias prescribe sacrifices and other religious ceremonies by which a man can go to heaven after his death. Some sacrifices sanction the killing of animals which is an offence against morality. Apart from that, heaven is not a place of unalloyed bliss. There are different kinds of enjoyment there, according

to the religious ceremonies performed by each man here. Where there is difference, there is bound to be discontent or envy or the like.

Then again, after enjoyment in heaven one will surely have to return to this earth and live again a life of misery as before (See *Gītā* IX, 20-21). Accordingly, the only way to root out misery once for all is to obtain an intimate knowledge of the Vyakta, the Avyakta and the Soul (*Jñā*).

2. The words Vyakta and Avyakta have been defined in *Kārikā* X below. But the '*Jñā*' has not been defined anywhere. It means either Consciousness Itself or the conscious *Puruṣa*. The self-same *Jñā* has been called *Pumān* in *Kārikā* XI. Thus, the *Yogavāśiṣtha Rāmāyaṇa* (V, 73) says that *Sāṃkhya*'s *Pumān* is the same as *Vedānta*'s Brahman.

3. But the most significant part of this *Kārikā* is the word "Vijñānāt". It forms a preamble indicating, as it does, the final aim of the *Sāṃkhya* philosophy and also its method of treatment of the subject.

The word *Vijñāna* does not mean symbolic knowledge or mere physical experience, such as we can obtain by direct cognition by the senses or by logical inferences or by instructions from others (*Kārikās* IV-V). It is a different

kind of knowledge, if we can call it knowledge, which in Vedānta is called Aparokṣa Jñāna and it is not to be obtained by the ordinary methods mentioned above; for, it comes from within and not from outside. This is the sort of knowledge which Sāṁkhyā seeks for, and which alone can remove misery once for all. Sāṁkhyā calls it Kevala Jñāna or Viśuddha Jñāna (Kārikā LXIV).

Now, therefore, Sāṁkhyā begins by examining our sensory equipment and shows at the end (Kārikās XLV-LVII) that on account of the inherent infirmity of this sensory equipment, the Puruṣa cannot obtain that intimate knowledge which alone can enable him to know his own self.

The sensory equipment, he goes on to say, is entirely a construction of the three Guṇas of Prakṛti and it is like a pair of human spectacles that gives the Puruṣa a distorted view of the reality. It is only when he casts it off (*i.e.*, when he can finally part with Prakṛti) that real and intimate knowledge comes to him. He need not go anywhere—but the knowledge appears of itself (See Kārikā LXIV). Then he can see his self by his self.

But what sort of a seeing is this? Does he see the soul like a man seeing his own

image in a mirror, or does he see it like a visionary visualizing in his own mind?

“No”, says Sāṃkhya. “The Puruṣa, by parting with Prakṛti, had also lost the equipment by which a man can see an image with an eye or visualize with a mind. The Puruṣa simply finds himself in the same status as he had had before entering into this world of woes; he now knows that the Prakṛti, which so long concealed the reality from him, was his own shadow. This is exactly the idea conveyed in Kārikā No. LXV below.

III. मूलप्रकृतिरविकृतिर्महाद्याः प्रकृतिविकृतयः सप्त ।
षोडशकस्तु विकारो न प्रकृतिर्विकृतिः पुरुषः ॥ ३ ॥

mūlaprakṛtir-avikṛtir-

mahadādyāḥ prakṛti-vikṛtayah sapta +
ṣoḍashakas-tu vikāro
na prakṛtir-na vikṛtiḥ puruṣaḥ ॥

III. The Prakṛti in her original state (as opposed to the Pradhāna of Kārikā XI, which is her subsequent state when her Guṇas come into action) is not a product of any change; the seven Tattvas (*viz.*, Mahattattva, Ahamkāra and the 5 Tanmātras) are products of changes from one state to another, each Tattva being related to the other immediately coming after it, in the relation of producer and product or

cause and effect; the 16 Tattvas (*viz.*, the 5 Mahābhūtas which are the products of the Tanmātras, the 10 sense-organs together with the mind which form the 11 products of the Ahāṃkāra Tattva) are final products which suffer no further change of state and, for the reason of that, are not the producers of anything else. The Puruṣa is neither the cause nor the result of any change.

Notes

1. The twenty-four Tattvas (including Prakṛti) are the only ingredients of both the worlds (the physical-world and the sense-world) and they form therefore the only subject-matter of our enquiry as to what we see or know and how. The various material objects of various shapes and colour in this world do not concern us in our present enquiry, because they are nothing but a mere assemblage of Tanmātras only. These Tattvas have been explained in the Introduction.

2. Note that, according to this Kārikā, Puruṣa and primal Prakṛti are both causeless (Ahetūmat) and, for the reason of that, Avyakta of Kārikā X.

Now, we proceed to enquire what we see and how we decide that our seeing is a true seeing.

IV. दृष्टमनुमानमासवचनं च, सर्वप्रमाणसिद्धत्वात् ।
 लिंगिधर्ममाणमिष्टं, प्रमेयसिद्धिः प्रमाणाद्भिः ॥ 8 ॥
 dr̥ṣṭam-anumānam-āptavacanam ca,
 sarvapramāṇa-siddhatvāt ;
 trividham pramāṇam iṣṭam,
 prameyasiddhiḥ pramāṇād-dhi ॥

IV. There are only three recognised modes of proof which can lead us to an understanding that the knowledge we have arrived at about a thing is true. They are : (1) direct cognition by the sense-organs, (2) inference by logical reasoning, and (3) valid testimony (Āpta-vacanam)—other modes of proof being included in these three; the establishment of the truth to be known about anything depends on the correctness of the mode of proving it.

Notes

1. Āpta-vacana means the testimony of one who is truthful and all-knowing. Correctly speaking, knowledge derived by one by reading the Vedas himself is not “āpta-vacana”, because there are no two persons here—one, the speaker, and the other, the listener. Accordingly, this kind of knowledge may be called mere inference. But the Vedas being revealed knowledge, it is held by all

Indian philosophers that a Śruti-vacana (a Saying of Veda) is the only infallible proof, the validity of which cannot be questioned.

Sāṁkhya's attitude towards the Vedas does not seem to be so respectful as that ; for, its object is to explain spiritual matters by very simple reasoning or by common-sense arguments, to all people, at all time, irrespective of their religious faith.

V. प्रतिविषयाध्यवसायो दृष्टं, विविधमनुमानमाख्यातम् ।
तस्मिन्नलिङ्गपूर्वकम्, आसन्नतिरासवचनं तु ॥ ५ ॥

prati-viṣayā-dhyavasāyo dṛṣṭam,
trividham-anumānam-ākhyātam ।
tal-liṅga-liṅgi-pūrvakam,
āpta-śrutir-āptavacanam tu ॥

V. Direct cognition is the final ascertainment of objects by the Buddhi (Adhyavasāya). Inference, which is based on a prior knowledge of a symbol and its relation to another symbol, is of three kinds. But Āptavacana is verbal testimony of a truthful and wise man.

Notes

1. The word 'tu' here implies that according to Sāṁkhya also, Āptavacana as a mode of proof is more reliable than the other two methods.

2. As regard the second mode of proof (Logical Inference), it requires a major term and a middle term, without which no inference can be drawn, and it is of three kinds, *viz.*,

- (i) Dr̥ṣṭavat, *e.g.*, to infer the existence of a fire by seeing the smoke from a distance;
- (ii) Śeṣavat—to deduce the characteristics of the whole by examining a part of it as a sample;
- (iii) Sāmānyatodr̥ṣṭa—which is Inductive Logic.

3. As regards direct cognition the most important thing to remember is that according to Sāṃkhya's Psychology which has been explained above, the final ascertainment of the object to be observed is the "Adhyvasāya" or the Buddhi.

VI. सामान्यतस्तु दृष्टात् अतीन्द्रियाणाम्रतौतिरनुमानात् ।

तस्मादपि चासिद्वं परोक्षमाप्तागमात् सिद्धम् ॥ ६ ॥

sāmānyatas-tu dṛṣṭāt
atīndriyāṇām pratīti-anumānāt ।
tasmat̄-api cā-siddham
parokṣam-āptā-gamāt siddham ॥

VI. Knowledge of objects beyond the power of the senses to take cognition of, may be derived by inference which is based on

analogy; what is obscure and not attainable even by inference may be knowable from Āptavacana.

Notes

Some matters, e.g., information about the gods in heaven, can be known only from Āptavacana.

VII. अतिदूरात् सामीप्यात् इन्द्रियघातान्मनोऽनवस्थानात् ।
 सौक्ष्म्याद्वयधानात् अभिभवात् समानाभिहाराच्च ॥ ७ ॥

atidūrāt sāmīpyād-
 indriyaghātān-mano'-navasthānāt ।
 sauksmyād-vyavadhānād-
 abhibhavāt samānābhīhārāc-ca ॥

VII. Non-perception of a thing which really exists may arise from the following causes :

- (1) extreme distance ;
- (2) extreme proximity to the eye ;
- (3) injury to the sense-organs ;
- (4) want of attention of the mind ;
- (5) extreme subtlety of the object, e.g., an atom ;
- (6) the object to be observed being veiled or suppressed ;
- (7) the object being mixed up with similar things.

Non Perception

VIII. सौहम्यात्तदनुपलब्धिर्भावात्, कार्यतस्तदुपलब्धे ।
 महदादि तत्र कार्ये प्रकृतिसरूपं विरूपं च ॥ ८ ॥

saukṣmyāt tadanupalabdhīr-
 nā-bhāvāt kāryatas-tadupalabdheḥ ।
 mahadādi tac-ca kāryam
 prakṛtisarūpam virūpam ca ॥

VIII. Non-perception of the Prakṛti is due to its subtlety and not to non-existence : since its existence can be inferred as being a cause of Mahattattva and the others, some of which are like it and the others unlike.

Notes

The idea is that every action (or change) has a cause and that the caused always exists in latent form in its cause, as will be explained in the next Kārikā.

Some of the effects produced by the action of the Prakṛti, viz., the Mahattattva, the Ahamkāra Tattva and the Tanmātras, are unobservable like Prakṛti itself and some, viz., the mind, Buddhi and the sense-organs and the five Mahābhūtas are, unlike Prakṛti, observable. From all these Tattvas we can reasonably infer that Prakṛti exists as their cause.

IX. असद्करणादुपादानग्रहणात् सर्वसंभवाभावात् ।
 शक्तस्य शक्त्यकरणात्, कारणभावात् सत्कार्यम् ॥ ९ ॥

asad-akaraṇād-upādāna-grahaṇāt
 sarvasaṃbhavā-bhāvāt |
 śaktasya śakya-karaṇāt, kāraṇa-bhāvāc-ca
 satkāryam ||

IX. The effect even prior to its manifestation always exists as a real entity in its cause (which also must always be a real entity), as the following considerations will show :

(1) Asadakaraṇāt : Nothing can be produced out of a thing which is as non-existent as the barren woman's son.

(2) Upādānagrahaṇāt : In producing anything, one has to have recourse to the proper materials out of which only that thing can be produced. We cannot produce curd from water. Only milk can produce it. This shows that the effect has a certain fixed relation to its cause.

(3) Sarva Saṃbhavābhāvāt : It is not possible to press out oil from sand. Oil can be obtained from mustard seed or such other seeds in which it exists. This shows that the effect always exists in latent form in its cause ; otherwise, it would be possible to produce all things from anything.

(4) Śaktasya Śakyakaraṇāt : It is common knowledge that the effect must be such as is within the power of the cause to create.

There must therefore be a relation between the cause and the effect as regards potency also.

(5) Kāraṇabhāvāt : The cause and its effect have inherent or intrinsic similarity or they may be as non-different as the woven cloth from its cause, viz., the threads.

According to Sāṃkhya, everything has a cause. The cause and its effect always co-exist even before the latter becomes known or visible. Nothing happens by chance. Chance, according to Sāṃkhya, is a meaningless word used by us to cover our own ignorance when we cannot ascertain the cause of a thing. As shown in Kārikā III above, the whole universe is a continuous process of change of causes into their effects.¹ The root cause, which itself is causeless, is Avyakta of the next Kārikā.

X. हैतुमदनित्यमव्यापि सक्रियमनेकमाश्रितं लिङ्गम् ।

सावयवं परतन्त्रं व्यक्तं, विपरीतमव्यक्तम् ॥ १० ॥

hetumat, anityam, avyāpi,
sakriyam, anekam, āśritam, liṅgam |
sāvayavam, paratantram,
vyaktam, viparītam avyaktam ||

¹ It is interesting to note that this is also the finding of modern science. - Jeans says : "The whole universe is an organization and its present state is an effect of its antecedent state and the cause of the state which is to follow."

X. The Vyakta is caused, perishable, not all-pervading, manifold, dependent, mergent, has a form or shape and supported (by others). The Avyakta is just the reverse of all these.

Notes

1. These attributes can be deduced from the very fact of a thing being Vyakta or Avyakta, as the case may be :

The Vyakta, being caused, is obviously limited by its cause which pervades it : it must be dependent on its cause, it must derive its nourishment from its cause. Having been caused, it cannot be eternal, and one day when it ceases to exist, it will have to merge into its own cause. Thus, being perishable, it must have got some sort of activity inherent in it, because without such an activity, nothing can change or perish.

Then again the Vyakta, being limited by its cause, must have a dimension or a shape, —they are obviously many.

We can similarly argue that the Avyakta is unlimited, inactive or static, all-pervading and so forth. The Avyakta must be immanent in everything. Being all-pervading it must be, always be, One, because we cannot conceive of two separate all-pervading entities.

2. It must be noted here that Sāmkhya

Philosophy primarily deals with the sense-world but it has been so written that the Kārikās apply equally to both the worlds. How is it, then, that Buddhi, mind and the sense-organs (which are Vyaktas) have dimensions or shapes?

The answer is that all material objects have four dimensions—three in space and one (*viz.*, duration) in time.

Buddhi and the others have only a time-dimension. As has been stated above, the Buddhi is supposed to be a slate on which are recorded the events of the external world. The writing is changing every moment and along with it, the shape of the Buddhi is also changing.

In the next Kārikā it will be stated that Avyakta is conscious and the Vyakta is non-conscious, or in other words, the Avyakta is the “Seer” and the Vyakta is the “seen”. Why this must be so has been explained in Part III of the Introduction.

XI. त्रिगुणमविवेकि विषयः सामान्यमचेतनम्प्रसवधर्मि ।
व्यक्तं, तथा प्रधानम्, तद्विपरीतस्तथा च पुमान् ॥ ११ ॥

triguṇam, aviveki viṣayah
 sāmānyam, acetanam, prasavadharmaḥ
 vyaktam, tathā pradhānam,
 tadviparītas-tathā ca pumān ॥

(The expression Tathāca in Sanskrit is a phrase, the meaning of which is, “notwithstanding all that has been said above”.)

XI. Notwithstanding what has been said above (in Kārikā III as to Prakṛti and Pumān being the same Avyakta) Prakṛti or Pradhāna in the manifested state, like any other manifested object (Vyakta), is composed of the three Guṇas; inseparable from the said Guṇas; object of the senses, common object of cognition for all observers alike; non-conscious; and productive; but the Pumān being the reverse of these remains Avyakta as before.

Notes

1. It will be explained in Kārikā XIV that this change of status of changeless primal Prakṛti occurred because Prakṛti's three Guṇas are now operating. Without these Guṇas, nothing can be an object of cognition, nothing can be productive, and nothing could be “seen” by a “Seer” (See Introduction, Part III).

2. Aviveki—The manifested object being nothing but so many assemblages of Guṇas are inseparable from the latter. I have shown in the Introduction how this conclusion of Sāṃkhya has been now experimentally verified by the Quantum Theory, according to which there is nothing in matter except the three modes of

activity of energy (mass, momentum and stress).

3. The word Pumān has given rise to some confusion amongst the commentators. Gauḍapāda said that the Pumān of this Kārikā is always one and cannot be many. Other commentators think that Gauḍapāda has probably made a mistake because, according to the Sāṃkhya Philosophy, Puruṣas are many, and Pumān is the same thing as Puruṣa.

It is unnecessary to point out how Gauḍapāda has very rightly interpreted the Kārikā. He has made it clear that the same Pumān, from above space-time, manifested himself as many Puruṣas below. This is quite a Vedāntic conception of creation.

XII. प्रीत्यप्रीतिविषादात्मकाः प्रकाशप्रवृत्तिनियमार्थाः ।
अन्योन्याभिभवाश्चयजननमिथुनवृत्तयश्च गुणाः ॥ १२ ॥

prīty-aprīti-viṣadā-tmakāḥ
prakāśa-pravrtti-niyamārthāḥ ।
anyonyā-bhibhavā-'śraya-
janana-mithuna-vṛttayaś-ca guṇāḥ ॥

XII. The Guṇas give rise to delight, sorrow and indifference, they illumine, accelerate and restrain. These, their functions, they discharge, acting together, suppressing or helping each other, one of them working at a time

with the co-operation of the other two. (See Illustration in the Introduction, Part V.)

XIII. सत्त्वं लघु प्रकाशकमिष्टमुपष्टम्भकं चलं च रजः ।
गुरु वरणकमेव तमः, प्रदीपवच्चार्थतो वृत्तिः ॥ १३ ॥

sattvam laghu prakāśakam
iṣṭam-upaṣṭambhakam calaṁ ca rajah ।
guru varanakam eva tamaḥ,
pradīpavac-cā-rthato vṛttih ॥

XIII. Sattva Guṇa is said to be light and illumining ; Rajas, stimulating and accelerating ; Tamas, heavy and restraining ; these three Guṇas act in co-operation towards a goal just like a lamp.

Notes

1. Wick, oil and fire—three different things, opposed to each other, co-operate in a lamp, the object of which is to give a light. So do the three Guṇas of opposite characteristics co-operate and act towards an object.

The object of this activity of the Guṇas is, according to Sāṃkhya, the enjoyment of the soul and its final release from all miseries.

2. The Guṇas give rise to pleasure, sorrow or delusion in the mind ; but it will be a mistake to suppose that they are the same thing as those feelings. Those feelings have no

objectivity. They have no existence of their own apart from a human mind. But the Guṇas exist in their own right and as a matter of fact ; nothing in the world can exist without them. The Guṇas, and the feelings they give rise to, are related to each other as cause and effect (See Kārikā XXXVIII below).

XIV. अविवेक्यादेः सिद्धस्तैगुण्यात्तद्विपर्ययाभावात् ।

कारणगुणात्मकत्वात्कार्यस्याव्यक्तमपि सिद्धम् ॥ १४ ॥

avivekyādēḥ siddhaḥ traigunyāt tad-
viparyayā-'bhāvāt ।
kāraṇa-guṇā-'tmakatvāt kāryasyā-
'vyaktam api siddham ॥

XIV. The attributes—inseparableness, objectivity, non-consciousness etc. (mentioned in Kārikā XI)—of the Vyakta follow from the very fact that the Vyakta is composed entirely of the three Guṇas and that it could not exist if it were not so composed ; the effect being of the same nature as its cause, the Avyakta is also known (*i.e.*, we can know that the Guṇas must have existed in latent form in the Avyakta).

Notes

This most important Kārikā not only explains itself in the light of what has been

said in the Introduction, Part III, but it also explains how and wherefrom non-consciousness could come into this world.

Take away the Guṇas and the whole space including all that it contains vanishes at once. Nothing now remains except the conscious Avyakta which, as will be shown in the next Kārikā, is the only cause of the creation including the Guṇas themselves.

XV. भेदानां परिमाणात् समन्वयात् शक्तिः प्रवृत्तेष्व ।
कारणकार्यविभागाद्विभागाद्वैश्वरूप्यस्य ॥ १५ ॥

bhedānām parimāṇāt,
samanvayāt, śaktitah pravṛtteś-ca |
kāraṇa-kārya-vibhāgād
avibhāgād-vaiśvarūpyasya ||

(The clause “Kāraṇamasty-avyaktam” in the first line of the next Kārikā is the concluding portion of this Kārikā and not a part of Kārikā XVI.)

XV. That the Avyakta is the root cause of this creation can be inferred from the following five considerations :

(1) *Bhedānām Parimāṇāt* : The finitude of the diverse :—All the various objects beginning from Mahattattva are finite and limited and must therefore be caused. That cause again must have its own cause, that again a

third cause and so on. Ultimately we arrive at an uncaused cause, and that is the Avyakta of Kārikā X—the root cause of the whole creation.

(2) *Samanvayāt* : Sameness in diversity :—If we think of the various objects in the world, we find that they have a common characteristic, *viz.*, that they are all made of the Three Guṇas. Take away the Guṇas and you arrive at the Avyakta. It follows therefore that the Avyakta is the root cause of all.

(3) *Śaktitāḥ Pravṛtteśca* : The effect depending on the potentiality of the cause, as explained above in Kārikā IX.

When we consider about the magnitude of the activity of the universe, we cannot but be convinced that there must be an immense immeasurable force at work. This force being observable and for the reason of that a Vyakta element, it cannot exist without depending on a support (Āśrita of Kārikā X). If we go on thinking, we find that the last support must be itself supportless (Anāśrita), *i.e.*, the Avyakta of Kārikā X.

(4) *Kāraṇakārya-vibhāgāt* : The distinction made between the cause and its effects :—The Vyaktas (including the Pradhāna) are caused, but they cannot be exactly of the same description as their causes, for, that would mean a complete merger of effects into their causes.

What distinguish the Vyaktas from their cause are the five attributes mentioned in Kārikā XI. Take them away and you arrive at the cause which obviously is the Avyakta of Kārikā X.

(5) *Vaiśvarūpyasya Avibhāgāt* : Continuity of the diversity of the Universe :—The diverse objects in this Universe beginning from Mahattattva downwards are the result of a continuous change of causes into effects as explained above. Now, at dissolution, the reverse processes, *i.e.*, merger of effects into their causes, must happen. Thus the Mahābhūtas will merge into their cause, *i.e.*, the Tanmātras, the Tanmātras into the Ahamkāra Tattva and the latter into Pradhāna and Pradhāna into the Avyakta.

In the same way, the entire sense-world will merge into the same Ahamkāra Tattva and finally into the Avyakta which is the root cause of the whole creation.

Notes

1. Now, it being established that there is nothing in this world except the activity of the three Guṇas, the question arises, how then do we see so many objects of various shapes and colour around us.

I have shown above how this very question arose in Europe about thirty years ago and how

the scientists there solved it by their new Psychology.

In the next Kārikā, Sāṃkhya has solved the very same problem by the same psychology.

XVI. कारणमस्त्वव्यक्तम्, प्रवर्तते त्रिगुणतः समुदयाच्च ।
परिणामतः सलिलवत् प्रतिप्रतिगुणाश्चयविशेषात् ॥ १६ ॥

kāraṇam-asty-avyaktam
pravartate triguṇataḥ samudayāc-ca +
parināmataḥ salilavat
pratipratiguṇāśrayaviśeṣāt ॥

XVI. Diversity of colour, taste, smell etc. arises from the three Guṇas acting in co-operation in various ways on various objects with which they come into contact; just as water gives rise to various tastes in various plants that absorb it.

Notes

1. A ray of white sunlight (Rūpa Tanmātra) has no distinguishing (Viśeṣa) colour. It is only a bare particle of energy. But when it falls on a prism or a dew-drop, it decomposes itself into its components and thus gives rise to various colours. Similarly Rasa Tanmātra, which forms water and which has no taste of its own, gives rise to various tastes when it comes in contact with various objects

as stated in this Kārikā. The five Tanmātras, which are mere particles of energy, give rise to all sorts of colour, taste, sound etc. (See Kārikā XXXIV). (Compare Fourier's Theorem --The Viśesa of Sāmkhya being exactly Fourier's Components of Mathematics.)

2. Now, our search into the Physical Universe is at an end. We find that there is nothing in it except a play of the three Guṇas, but there is a method in this play, for, the Guṇas work towards an object. They work from the direction of cause to effect and never in the opposite direction, *viz.*, from effect to cause. Moreover, we find that they work in co-operation with precise regularity like three intelligent persons working together with a common purpose. Who organized them to work in the way they are doing? Let us, therefore, peep into the other world—*viz.*, the sense-world, without which the physical world would be quite meaningless.

XVII. संघातपरार्थत्वात् त्रिगुणादिविपर्ययादधिष्ठानात् ।
पुरुषोऽस्ति भोक्तृभावात्कैवल्यार्थं प्रवृत्तेश्च ॥ १७ ॥

saṅghātapaṛarthaṭvāt,
triguṇādiparyayād-adhiṣṭhānāt ।
puruṣo-'sti bhoktṛbhāvāt
kaivalyārtham pravṛtteś-ca ॥

XVII. The Puruṣa must exist, because :

(1) *Samghāta Parārthatvāt* : We have nothing to worry about when inanimate things lie scattered about here and there without any symmetry or arrangement. But when we find that they are so arranged that they can serve an useful purpose, we know that an intelligent person must have arranged them for himself or for another. The very symmetry, order and law of the universe afford a proof therefore that the Puruṣa exists.

(2) *Triguṇādīviparyayād* : The person referred to above is surely unlike, or the reverse of, the things arranged by him. The things are non-conscious and mere objects of the senses (as per Kārikā XI). He must therefore be conscious, not an object of the senses—or, in other words, he must be the Seer.

(3) *Adhiṣṭhānāt* : Inanimate things cannot work or serve an useful purpose unless they are directed into a proper channel by an intelligent being, just as a motor car cannot run without a driver.

(4) *Bhoktṛbhāvāt* : There is surely some one to enjoy (otherwise the whole creation will be meaningless).

(5) *Kaivalyāriham Pravṛtteśca* : There is a desire (as said in Kārikā I) for absolute release from misery. This desire cannot be of the

Buddhi or of any inanimate substance like Prakṛti, because, as will be shown hereafter, absolute release cannot be had without parting from the Buddhi or destroying it altogether. Buddhi cannot be said to desire its own destruction. This desire must belong to one who is not the Buddhi.

Notes

1. This Kārikā is not difficult to understand. The only thing to remember about it is that it applies equally to both the worlds. In the sense-world the inanimate things referred to are our Buddhi and the whole sensory equipment and the organizer is our soul. In the entire physical universe the organizer is the Pumān of Karika XI.

2. The main argument here is :

(i) *Samghāta Parārthatvāt*, i.e., there can be no order, law, symmetry or co-operation in an assemblage of inanimate objects unless some intelligent being had skilfully arranged them to work for a certain object and under fixed laws.

In the physical world it is our daily experience that such an organization exists. We have also discovered most of the Laws there.

In the sense-world also we find the same design, harmony and co-operation amongst the

sense-organs and there are fixed laws under which they function (See Kārikā XXX and XXXI).

XVIII. जननमरणकरणानां प्रतिनियमादयुगपत्प्रवृत्तेष्व ।

पुरुषबहुलं सिद्धं त्रैगुण्यविपर्ययाच्चेव ॥ १८ ॥

janana-maraṇa-karaṇānām
pratiniyamād-ayugapati-pravṛtteś-ca ।
puruṣa-bahutvam siddham
traigunya-viparyayāc-caiva ॥

XVIII. The incidence of birth and death and the action of the Indriyas being different for different individuals; all men not having the same inclinations at the same time; the thoughts arising out of the action of the three Guṇas being different for different men—it follows that souls (Puruṣas) are many (each man having a separate soul—See Introduction).

XIX. तस्माच्च विपर्यासात्सिद्धं साक्षित्वमस्य पुरुषस्य ।

कैवल्यमाध्यस्थं द्रष्टृत्वमकर्णं भावेष्व ॥ १९ ॥

tasmāc-ca viparyāsāt
siddham sākṣitvam asya puruṣasya ।
kaivalyam, mādhyasthyam,
draṣṭṛtvam, akartṛbhāvaś-ca ॥

XIX. And from the contrast with the three Guṇas follow the characteristics of the

Puruṣa being merely a witness, arbitrator, or Seer, with no activity of its own, free of all connections with anything, and thus standing alone by itself.

Notes

1. Being pure consciousness, the Puruṣa has no activity. He lives in his prison-house from which he can see nothing but his Buddhi. He sees it and gives a meaning to it just as a man sees a photograph and understands it. He has no similarity with anything else—he being conscious and everything else being the reverse.

2. The most important thing in this Kārikā is the inactivity of the Soul, leading to the controversy about free will. This question has been very elaborately discussed in the Gītā. It is not necessary to go into it here again, for, it has been easily solved by the Sāṃkhya Philosophy.

It is now admitted by all that the spring of all our actions comes from what modern science calls the “Sub-conscious mind” and its “Auto-suggestion”. (In Indian Philosophy we call the sub-conscious mind our “Samskāra” or “Liṅga Śarira”.)¹

¹ As regards the difference between the Samskāra or Buddhi and the Liṅga Śarira, see my booklet in Assamese “Janmāntara Rahasya”, p. 88, footnote 2,

This being so, if it be held (as has been held by many) that the Liṅga or Buddhi, with its induced consciousness, is the Soul, then there is absolutely no doubt that we are all of us free agents.

But Sāṃkhya does not say so. As stated above, according to it the Soul stands alone and is quite a separate thing from Buddhi. It has no activity of its own. The question of free will does not arise at all in this philosophy. The only question which arises is this—“If the Soul is not the doer, why do then men think that they are the doers of their actions?”

This question has been answered in the next Kārikā.

XX. तस्मात्संयोगादचेतनं चेतनावदिव लिङ्गम् ।
गुणकर्तृत्वेऽपि तथा कर्तव्य भवत्युदासीनः ॥ २० ॥

tasmāt tatsamyoगाद-acetanam
cetanāvadiva liṅgam ।
guṇākartṛtve-'pi tathā karte-va
bhavaty-udāśinah ॥

XX. Hence (*i.e.*, from the fact that the Puruṣa contemplates upon the Buddhi) the Liṅga, *i.e.*, the non-conscious Buddhi, by virtue of its connection (Samyoγa) with the Puruṣa behaves like a conscious being or appears to

be conscious ; thus, though activity is a function of the Guṇas only, the disinterested non-doer (*i.e.*, the Puruṣa) thinks himself to be the doer.

Notes

1. This is why a man thinks that he is the doer of his actions. He thinks the Saṃskāra to be his soul and according to Sāṃkhya it is ignorance to think the Saṃskāra to be the soul (Kārikā XLVIII).

XXI. पुरुषस्य दर्शनार्थं कौवल्यार्थं तथा प्रधानस्य ।
पङ्गवन्धवदुभयोरपि संयोगस्तत्कृतः सर्गः ॥ २१ ॥

puruṣasya darśanārthaṁ
kaivalyārthaṁ tathā pradhānasya ।
paṅgva-andhavad ubhayor-
api samyogas-tatkṛtaḥ saṅgah ॥

XXI. This connection (samyoga) of the Pradhāna (Buddhi) with the Puruṣa is like the association of a blind man with a lame one, and it serves a dual purpose of the Pradhāna being contemplated upon by the Puruṣa and the consequent attainment of *kaivalya* (the state of loneliness or release) by the latter. Thus they two have made the creation what it is.

Notes

1. The word Samyoga which occurs in these Kārikās is not like a mere contact of one object with another. It is like a contact of the mind with a matter, e.g.,

- (i) I can sing, but I do not always sing. I sing when I think of singing. This is the Samyoga of the mind with a song.
- (ii) Thoughts are always within me, but I am not aware of them. I recall a thought to my consciousness when occasion arises. This is a samyoga of the consciousness with the inanimate or dead thought stored up in Buddhi from a long time.

2. This association (Samyoga) of the Puruṣa and Prakṛti is as eternal as the world itself. Without it there would be no seer and nothing to see. But at the same time it is not a natural or inseparable connection as exists between the fire and its heat. The heat cannot be separated, or thought of separately, from the fire. Not so inseparable is the connection between the Puruṣa and the Prakṛti. We daily remain separated from Prakṛti in our deep and dreamless sleep when our thoughts lie dormant.

3. It is only when a man can part with

Prakṛti that he can attain the supreme state of freedom and happiness. The illustration of a blind man carrying a lame one is therefore quite apt and full of meaning. These two men associate for a common purpose, *viz.*, going to a distant place, and they separate as soon as their common object is attained ; so is the Purusa linked with Prakṛti for a particular object (*i.e.*, for our enjoyment) and they must part as soon as that object is attained.

XXII. प्रकृतेर्महांस्तोऽहम्कारस्तस्माद्गण्ड षोडशकाः ।
तस्मादपि षोडशकात् पञ्चभ्यः पञ्च भूतानि ॥ २२ ॥

prakṛter-mahāṁs-tato-'hamkāras-tasmād-
gaṇaś-ca ṣoḍaśakah ।
tasmād-api ṣoḍaśakāt pañcabhyah
pañca bhūtāni ॥

XXII. From Prakṛti proceeds the Mahattattva (equivalent to Buddhi) ; thence the Ahamkāra Tattva (the ego-sense) ; thence the aggregate of the sixteen (11 sense-organs, including the mind, and the 5 Tanmātras) ; and from the latter five the five Mahābhūtas come out.

Notes

1. These are the only ingredients of the sense-world—which we are now enquiring into.

XXIII. अध्यवसायो बुद्धिर्मो ज्ञानं विराग ऐश्वर्यम् ।
सात्त्विकमेतद्रूपं तामसमस्माद्विपर्यस्तम् ॥ २३ ॥

adhyavasāyo buddhir-
dharmo jñānam virāga aiśvaryam !
sāttvikam etad-rūpam,
tāmasam-asmād-viparyastam !!

XXIII. Determination (Adhyavasāya) is the Buddhi; virtue, wisdom, non-attachment and super-human power constitute its Sāttvika form; the reverse of these constitute its Tāmasa form.

Notes

1. It has been stated above that the Buddhi or the Linga or the Saṃskāra—all these three terms, for our present purpose, implying the same things—is only a store-house of thoughts and nothing more. Sāṃkhya has now classified these thoughts into eight categories as stated in this Kārikā. For the sake of simplicity, the Gīta has classified them into three categories only, viz., Sāttvika, Rājasika and Tāmasika. This has been done with a view to showing how the stored-up thoughts determine the quality of all our actions, our character and everything else. Our actions, our food, our temper and everything else have been classified into the same three divisions. A man,

it is said, of Sāttvika nature can do only Sāttvika actions, can take only Sāttvika food and so forth. Conversely, if we know that a man always does Sāttvika actions or is fond of Sāttvika food, we may be sure that his thoughts are Sāttvika also.

This is how we can guess what actions a man is likely to do and what he cannot do. That is to say, his actions are controlled, and their quality is determined by rules of thoughts and not by himself (*i.e.*, not by his soul). It is these thoughts which make the man what he is.

2. When a man does any little action, its effect pervades throughout the world and it alters the course of the world, more or less, for all time to come. Suppose, I set fire to a forest. I have nothing more to do with this action of mine. What I have done is done and it cannot be undone. But its effect will be to disturb the meteorological conditions of the whole world—there may be scarcity of food in one place, excessive rain in another, causing the breach of a bridge, and ending in a railway accident and so forth. I have altered the future course of the world. This sort of effect of an action is not what I am directly concerned with. I am concerned only with the effect that my action has upon my Buddhi. Every little action that I do, or every little

thought that I think, alters the shape of the Buddhi, as stated above, and this altered shape determines my future action and the latter again alters the shape of the Buddhi still more and this altered shape determines my subsequent actions—and so on for ever. The action and reaction between the Buddhi and the thoughts have been going on ceaselessly from the day of creation and will so go on till its end. All actions thus end in thoughts with which alone I am directly concerned.

This is what Sāmkhya calls 'fruit of action' (See Kārikās XLIV & XLV below).

He knows of no other 'fruit of action' and according to him thought includes 'action'. If we could entirely subdue the Saṃskāra, no action of ours, however sinful, can have an effect on us in any way. (Compare Gītā V, 7-12.)

3. Sāmkhya has, to be quite comprehensive, classified these thoughts into eight categories (not into three, as the Gītā has done). He shows that thoughts not only determine the quality of our actions, and our future transmigrations but they also give us the power to act. According to him, therefore, man is like a tethered animal tied to his Saṃskāra as a post or pole. As the rope lengthens, i.e., as the Saṃskāra brightens up, not only the quality

of his act improves but he acquires more and more freedom of movement ; his power to do superhuman work increases. Finally, when he becomes free of the seven kinds of thoughts, his soul is released (see Kārikā LXIII). This will be clear from a consideration of the eight categories into which thoughts have been divided :—

- (i) Jñāna, *i.e.*, Wisdom—It means the discriminative knowledge of the Soul and the Buddhi.
- (ii) Dharma, *i.e.*, Virtue—It means that sort of thought which enables man to live and prosper in this world and also ensures his spiritual progress.
- (iii) Virāga—It is non-attachment to worldly matters.
- (iv) Aiśvarya, *i.e.*, God-like power—It is the kind of thought which enables the yogins to do wonderful things by thinking of them alone ; such thoughts have been divided into eight kinds, *viz.* :—
 - (a) Animā—the power to enter into all things.
 - (b) Laghimā, *i.e.*, Lightness—the power to rise up to the sky.
 - (c) Garimā—which enables the yogin to make his body extremely heavy.

- (d) Mahimā—Extensive magnitude.
- (e) Īśitva—Power to lord over anything.
- (f) Vaśitva—Subjugation of all elements.
- (g) Prāpti—That sort of thought which enables a man to get whatever he desires.
- (h) Prākāmya—infallibility of purpose.

(4) Thus the Sāṃkhya Philosophy has reduced the whole universe to two categories (actions having merged into thoughts), viz., consciousness and thoughts. The first is called Puruṣa, and the second, the seven forms (shapes) of Prakṛti, which bind the Puruṣa (Kārikā LXIII). Later on it will be shown that thoughts have no objectivity of their own. The liberated Puruṣa knows this (Kārikā LXV); although a man as long as he is under bondage cannot think himself to have a separate existence apart from his thoughts.

XXIV. अभिमानोऽहङ्कारः, तस्माद्विधः प्रवर्तते सर्गः ।

एकादशकस्य गणस्तन्मात्रपञ्चकश्चैव ॥ २४ ॥

abhimāno-'haṅkārah,
tasmād-dvividhaḥ pravartate sargah ।
ekādaśakaś-ca gaṇaḥ,
tanmātra pañcakaś-caiva ॥

XXIV. Ahamkāra (*i.e.*, the ego-sense) is individuation or the conceit of one being a

separate entity; therefrom arise the two kinds of creation—the eleven aggregates (sense-organs and the mind) and the five Tanmātras.

Notes

1. The ego-sense and the rest are a creation of the Buddhi. It will be shown hereafter how the Indriyas and the body are all created by the Buddhi and how the latter is responsible for all the infirmities of the former. It, no doubt, seems unnatural that a thought of the Buddhi can create anything. But the matter loses all its mysteries when we remember that, according to Sāṃkhya, thoughts are only subtle energy and that it is only by thoughts that one can do super-human works, as stated in the preceding Kārikā.

XXV. सत्त्विक एकादशकः प्रवर्तते वै कृतादहङ्कारात् ।
 भूतादेस्तन्मात्रः स तामसः, तैजसादुभयम् ॥ २५ ॥

sāttvika ekādaśakah
 pravartate vaikṛtād-ahamkārāt ।
 bhūtādes-tanmātrah, sa
 tāmasah taijasād-ubhayam ॥

XXV. The Sāttvika eleven (mind and the sense-organs) proceed from the Vaikṛta Ahamkāra; the five Tanmātras (which are the original states of the five Bhūtas) proceed from that

form of Ahamkāra which is known as Bhūtādi (the origin of Bhūta or matter) ; it is of the nature of Tamas (dark or heavy) ; both these changes are by the action of the Taijasa Ahamkāra.

Notes

1. It is Rajas alone which can (in co-operation with the other two Guṇas) effect any change at all. It is, therefore, called Taijasa (force or activity). Vaikṛta, says Gauḍapāda, is the same thing as Sāttvika.

XXVI. बुद्धीन्द्रियाणि चहुः श्रीतव्वाणरसनत्वगारूप्यानि ।

वाक् पाञ्चपादपायूपस्थानि कर्मेन्द्रियाण्याहुः ॥ २६ ॥

buddhī-ndriyāṇi cakṣus-
śrotra-ghrāṇa-rasana-tvag-ākhyāni ।
vāk-pāni-pāda-pāyū-
pasthāni karme-ndriyāṇy-āhuḥ ॥

XXVI. The organs of cognition (buddhīn-driyāṇi) are eye, ear, nose, tongue and skin ; voice, hands, feet and the organs of excretion and generation are called organs of action (karmendriyāṇi).

XXVII. उभयात्मकमत्र मनः, सङ्कल्पकमिन्द्रियं च साधम्यत् ।

गुणपरिणामविशेषानानात्वं वाह्यभेदात् ॥ २७ ॥

ubhayātmakam-atra manah,
 samkalpakam-indriyam ca sādharmyāt !
 guṇapariṇāmaviśeṣān-
 nānātvam bāhyabhedāś-ca ||

XXVII. Here (among the Indriyas, both of cognition and of action) the Mind partakes the nature of both sets, it intends the functioning of both the sets and is therefore an Indriya like both : the varieties noticed in the construction and the working of the Indriyas are The result of the activity of the Guṇas ; so are the varieties in the external world.

Notes

1. This Kārikā is self-explanatory. It is, however, interesting to note what Gauḍapāda has to say about the expression “bāhya bhedāḥ” occurring at the end of the Kārikā.

He says that all changes and transformations in both these worlds are the works of the Guṇas, for they are the only workers of changes. Without them, the worlds would be quite static. But, he goes on to say, the changes and transformations in the sense-world and those in the external world have an intimate correspondence. Thus, for instance, man requires an eye to see. The Guṇas create the eye at the top of the head, so that seeing becomes easy.

The cow requires milk when a calf is born. She does not require it when the calf has grown up. The Guṇas have, therefore, built her body in such a way that milk will flow of itself, when required, and will cease to flow when not required.

Thus it appears as if Nature works with a design and a pre-thought. (Modern biology furnishes many such illustrations).

XXVIII. शब्दादिषु पञ्चानामालोचनमात्रमिथते हृत्तिः ।

वचनादानविहरणोत्सर्गानन्दाश्च पञ्चानाम् ॥ २८ ॥

śabdādiṣu pañcānām-
ālocana-mātram-iṣyate vṛttih !
vacanā-dāna-viharaṇo-
tsargā-nandāś-ca pañcānām ॥

XXVIII. In respect of sound etc. (*i.e.*, sound, touch, colour, smell and taste), the function of the five organs of cognition is a mere indeterminate awareness called ‘ālocana’; the functions of the five organs of action are speech, grasping, motion, excretion and sexual enjoyment.

Notes

1. The word ‘ālocana’ has been explained by Vācaspati by quoting a passage from the Purāṇa which runs as follows :—

अस्ति ह्यालोचनं ज्ञानं प्रथमं निर्विकल्पकम् ।
 वालमूकादिविज्ञानसदृशं सुरध्वस्तुजम् ॥
 ततः परं पुनर्वस्तु धर्मैर्जीवादिभिर्यथा ।
 वुद्गावसौयते साहि प्रत्यक्षत्वेन सम्मता ॥

The meaning of this passage is that sensations caused by external objects are mere vibrations to which the Buddhi afterwards assigns values, thereby making them subject-matters of our cognition. This is exactly what modern science has verified by experiments.

But some commentators, though not doubting the meaning of the above passage, doubt what Vācaspati meant by citing it (see *Sāṃkhya-Kārikā* by S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri, published by the Madras University, 3rd Edition, p. 53).

It will perhaps be pertinent here to state that European Philosophers also entertained such doubts about the new Psychology as I have said in Part VII of the Introduction above.

XXIX. स्वालक्षण्यं वृत्तिस्थयस्य सैषा भवत्यसामान्या ।
 सामान्यकरणवृत्तिः प्राणाद्या वायवः पञ्च ॥ २६ ॥

svālakṣaṇyam vṛttis-trayasya
 sai-śā bhavaty-asāmānyā ।
 sāmānya-karaṇa-vṛttiḥ
 prāṇādyā vāyavah pañca ॥

XXIX. Of the three internal organs (*viz.* Buddhi, Ahāmkāra and Mind), each has its own function,—this is not common to all of these ; but the functions of the five Prāṇas (Prāṇa, Apāna, Udāna, Vyāna and Samāna) are the functions which are common to all Indriyas.

Notes

1. The function of Buddhi is determination ; that of Ahāmkāra is self-consciousness ; that of the Mind is explication. But they cannot discharge their respective functions unless the Prāṇa is functioning at the same time.

XXX. युगपचतुष्यस्य तु वृत्तिः क्रमशब्द तस्य निर्दिष्टा ।

दृष्टे तथाऽप्यदृष्टे ब्रयस्य तत्पूर्विका वृत्तिः ॥ ३० ॥

yugapac-catuṣṭayaśya tu
vṛttih kramaśāś-ca tasya nirdiṣṭā ।
drṣte tathā-'py-adṛṣṭe
trayasya tatpūrvikā vṛttih ॥

XXX. In the case of what is present to perception, the functioning of the four (*viz.*, the internal organs and one external organ) may be simultaneous or successive ; similarly, in case of what is not present to perception (and therefore when none of the external organs have been functioning), the functioning of the

three internal organs based on previous perceptions, may be either simultaneous or successive.

Notes

1. Suppose a man sees a snake and immediately runs away. Here, the various stages, *i.e.*, the indeterminate seeing of the eye, the explication made by the mind, and the final determination to run away made by the Buddhi, followed in such quick succession that they may be considered to be simultaneous.

2. I heard a sound and saw a man in the darkness of the night ; I looked carefully and saw a weapon in his hand ; I further noticed that he was coming towards me. I thought he might kill me and therefore I ran away. Here the functions of the organs took place successively.

3. As regards matters not before us, the help of an external organ is not necessary. We perceive them by the internal organs alone. But in this case, a prior cognition is essential, because we cannot think of a thing which is not present as a thought in our Sāṃskāra ; we cannot imagine, for instance, of a particular taste which we have not tasted before. With this limitation, in cases of cognition by the internal organs alone, the processes of functioning may be either simultaneous or successive.

XXXI. स्वां स्वां प्रतिपद्यन्ते परस्पराकूतहेतुकां वृत्तिम् ।

पुरुषार्थं एव हेतुर्न केनचित्कार्यते करणम् ॥ ३१ ॥

svām svām pratipadyante
parasparā'-kūta-hetukām vṛttim ।
puruṣārtha eva hetur-
na kenacit kāryate karaṇam ॥

XXXI. The organs (both internal and external) discharge their respective functions prompted by a mutual common impulse ; that common impulse is the enjoyment, and final release thereby, of the Puruṣa ; the organs are not made to work by any one.

Notes

1. This Kārikā is also self-explanatory in the light of all that has been said before. Gauḍapāda makes it clearer when he says that the organs are not worked by God or by the Puruṣa. The thirteen organs are the three internal and the ten external organs. They work automatically.

XXXII. करणं त्रयोदशविधम्, तदाहरणधारणप्रकाशकरम् ।

कार्यं च तस्य दशधार्यार्थं धार्यं प्रकाश्यं च ॥ ३२ ॥

karaṇam trayodaśavidham,
tad-āharanā-dhāraṇā-prakāśakaram ।
kāryam ca tasya daśadhā-
'hāryam dhāryam prakāśyam ca ॥

XXXII. The organs are of thirteen varieties ; their functions are three, *viz.*, carrying, holding and illumining ; their actions are also of ten varieties of the nature of carrying, holding and illumining.

Notes

1. Thus, the sense-organs illumine the Buddhi and the latter preserves (holds) the cognition as thoughts for ever. The organs of actions simply carry objects from one place to another (as the feet carry the body).

2. Gauḍapāda has explained this Kārikā in a simpler way. According to him, carrying and holding are functions of the organs of action, while the sense-organs only illumine the Buddhi.

XXXIII. अन्तःकरणं त्रिविधं दशधा बाह्यं त्रयस्य विषयाख्यम् ।
साम्प्रतकालं बाह्यं त्रिकालभ्यन्तरं करणम् ॥ ३३ ॥

antahkraṇam trividham, daśadhā
bāhyam trayasya viṣayā-'khyam !
sāmprata-kālam bāhyam,
trikālam-ābhyanṭaram karaṇam ॥

XXXIII. The internal organs are of three kinds ; the external organs, which alone make objects known to the three internal organs, are ten-fold ; the external organs can function only

in the present ; the internal organs can function (*i.e.*, think) in the past, the present and the future alike (without any distinction).

Notes

1. In his comments on this Kārikā, Vācaspati has explained why Sāṃkhya does not recognise time as an independent or objective category. When we think of a series of past events (already known to us), and also of some future events which are likely to follow, the idea of time-interval does not occur to us. If time were an objective something, the idea of time-interval between two events would have been always there inseparably linked with the events themselves. Sāṃkhya, therefore, begins by saying that the idea of time (*i.e.*, astronomical time) is something which has no objectivity ; it is a creation of the mind but the ignorant man thinks it to be a substance. (See Yoga Sūtra, Vyāsa Bhāṣya, III, 5, 27.)¹

This is what he says about the astronomical time of the modern scientists. The relative and the only real time which the scientist speaks of, is not called time at all in the Sāṃkhya Philosophy, for as I said above, it is only the

¹ स स्वल्पं कालः वस्तुश्चन्वः बुद्धिं निर्माणः शब्दज्ञानापाती, लौकिकानां ब्रह्मित दर्शनानां वस्तु-स्वरूपं इव अवभासते ॥

idea of our own existence (ego-sense) in an endless time.

I have stated in the Introduction, Part II, how this eternal time, together with the idea of an infinite space, is a result of individuation of the soul in Ahamkāra Tattva.

This endless time is flowing from past to future in a ceaseless current like a river. Just as the terms "Up" and "Down" in case of the river will be meaningless without reference to the position of an object on its bank, so will the terms past, present and future be quite meaningless unless they relate to a certain change in the physical world, or a certain action which we do.

The false idea of an astronomical time arises out of, and ultimately vanishes into, the aforesaid eternal time (*i.e.*, the ego-sense), as the following illustration will show :

Suppose, I have to acquire a full knowledge of a particular object, say, an orange. I first see it and know its colour, shape and size ; next I smell it and know how it smells ; next I break it open or peel it and taste it, I know how it tastes. I do various acts one after another. I am smelling it now, this is my present ; seeing was my past and tasting will be my future. But all this time my ego-sense was with me. If one man smells, and another

tastes, neither of them will have a complete knowledge of the orange. The same "I" that did the smelling must also do the tasting. This is how knowledge is acquired and how the idea of past, present and future comes in.

This is a result of our not being able to think of more than one thing at a time or doing more than one work at a time. If all knowledge were always present in our mind, the above successiveness of events would vanish at once, just as the idea of time-interval vanishes when we think of a series of known past events extending over a long period of time.

Sāmkhya further says that the idea of both space and time (because they are linked together as stated above) occurs to us on account of the actions of the five Mahābhūtas. (See Sāmkhya Sūtra 2, 12.)

If there were no objects or changes in the physical universe and consequently nothing to see or think about, the idea of time and space disappears. What will then remain will be the bare idea of self-existence.

The two ideas, space and time, are inseparable according to modern science also :

(1) 'Henceforward space in itself and time in itself, as independent things, must sink into mere shadows.' (—Minkowski)

(2) ‘Thus Nature knows nothing of space and time separately, being concerned only with the four-dimensional continuum in which space and time are welded inseparably together into the product we may designate as ‘Space-time’. (—Jeans)

In classical physics they (time and space) were considered to be different objects and were measured with different units, *viz.*, a clock and a scale. This is why the Fitzgerald Contraction referred to in Part I of the Introduction arose in all their calculations.

XXXIV. बुद्धैन्द्रियाणि तेषां पञ्च विशेषाविशेषविषयाणि ।
वाग्भवति शब्दविषया शेषाणि तु पञ्चविषयाणि ॥ ३४ ॥

buddhī-'ndriyāṇi teṣāṁ
pañca viśeṣā 'viśeṣa-viṣayāṇi ।
vāg-bhavati śabda-viṣaya
śeṣāṇi tu pañca-viṣayāṇi ॥

XXXIV. Of these, the five organs of cognition have as their objects of cognition both the five Aviśeṣas (undivided into their components) and their components (viśeṣas), speech has only sound for its object; as regards the rest, *i.e.*, the organs of action, they have only the five Mahābhūtas as their objects.

Notes

1. The two words *Aviśeṣa* and *Viśeṣa* have been used in several places in these *Kārikās* and always in the sense given to them in the *Yoga Sūtras*.

In *Kārikā XVI* where the word *Viśeṣa* occurs, I indicated how the five *Tanmātras* are the sources of all tastes, colours, sounds, touches and smells in the world, whereas they themselves have no specific taste, colour etc. of any kind. They are mere energy, but certain material objects, constructed in a certain way, have the power to split up these *Tanmātras* into their component parts, according to fixed laws (Fourier's Theorem). Thus, white light falling on a spectroscope gives rise to all the various colours some of which we can see. The components are called *Viśeṣas* and the *Tanmātras* are *Aviśeṣas*.

Now, it is said in this *Kārikā* that the sense-organs can take cognition of both the *Viśeṣas* and *Aviśeṣas*. This, as pointed out by Gauḍapāda, is true only of the gods and the sages, because the ordinary man cannot see the *Tanmātras* although they can know of its existence by inference. The organ of speech has sound as its object, and as regards this, sages, gods and men—all have the same power to convert thoughts into

sound without any outside help. The remaining organs can only function when they have as their objects material bodies built up of the five Mahābhūtas.

XXXV. सान्तःकरणा बुद्धिः सर्वं विषयमवगाहते यस्मात् ।
तस्मात्तिविधं करणं द्वारि द्वाराणि शेषाणि ॥ ३५ ॥

sāntahkaraṇā buddhiḥ sarvam
viṣayam-avagāhate yasmāt
tasmat̄ trividham karaṇam
dvāri dvārāṇi śeṣāṇi ॥

XXXV. Since the Buddhi with the other (two) internal organs determines finally all truths and knowledge about the objects of the sense-organs, the three internal organs stand to the sense-organs in the relation of the door-keeper and the door.

Notes

1. The sense-organs, as I have shown above, are mere apertures through which vibrations from the outside enter into our cerebral centres. It is the Buddhi which turns them into shape and make them objects of cognition.

The same idea is contained in Gītā, V, 1:

XXXVI. एते प्रदीपकल्पाः परस्परविलक्षणा गुणविशेषाः ।
क्षत्स्नं पुरुषस्थार्थं प्रकाशय बुद्धौ प्रयच्छन्ति ॥ ३६ ॥

ete pradīpa-kalpāḥ
 parasparsa-vilakṣaṇā guṇa-viśeṣāḥ ।
 kṛtsnam puruṣasyā-'rtham
 prakāśya buddhau prayacchanti ॥

XXXVI. These (*i.e.*, external organs, the mind and the Ahārnkāra) are derived from the Guṇas and are component parts of the Guṇas; they are unlike each other. They are (in this respect) comparable to a lamp; they illumine all objects of enjoyment of the Puruṣa and present them to the Buddhi.

XXXVII. सर्वं प्रत्युपभोगं यस्मात्पुरुषस्य साध्यति बुद्धिः ।
 सैव च विशिनेष्टि पुनः प्रधानपुरुषान्तरं सूक्ष्मम् ॥ ३७ ॥
 sarvam praty-upabhogam
 yasmāt puruṣasya sādhayati buddhiḥ ।
 sai'va ca viśinaṣṭi punah
 pradhāna-puruṣā-'ntaram sūkṣmam ॥

XXXVII. The materials worked upon by all other organs being presented to Buddhi, it is the Buddhi which brings about the enjoyment of the Puruṣa in all matters, and it is that Buddhi again which reveals to the Puruṣa the incomprehensible difference between the Prakṛti and the Puruṣa (See Kārikā LXIV).

XXXVIII. तन्मात्राण्यविशेषाः, तेभ्यो भूतानि पञ्च पञ्चभ्यः ।
 एते स्मृता विशेषाः, शान्ताः शोराञ्च मूढाञ्च ॥ ३८ ॥

tanmātrāny-aviśeṣāḥ,
tebhyo bhūtāni pañca pañcabhyah
ete smṛtā viśeṣāḥ,
śāntāḥ ghorāś-ca mūḍhāś-ca ॥

XXXVIII. The Tanmātras are Aviśeṣa ; from these five Tanmātras proceed five Mahābhūtas ; these (latter) are said to be Viśeṣas ; (they are objects of our enjoyment) and they produce in our mind the feelings of tranquillity, horror or delusion (as the case may be) under different circumstances.

Notes

1. The Tanmātras, says Gauḍapāda, are enjoyable by gods and sages and they give pleasure to them alone. As said above, Tanmātras are not perceptible to human senses.
2. It will be a mistake to suppose that the feelings of tranquillity, horror or delusion are attached to the material objects. Lest we should make such a mistake, Gauḍapāda has given examples to show that the same object may be a source of delight to one, a source of sorrow to another and a source of delusion to a third.
3. We were told in Kārikā XXII that the sense-world is a creation of thoughts of the Buddhi just as the physical world is a

creation of the Tanmātras. We have also been told how all the external organs and the two internal organs (the Mind and the Ahamkāra) are subordinate to the Buddhi. In the following Kārikās, it will be shown how the organs are naturally created by thoughts of the Linga. For this purpose, Sāṃkhya will begin with the impregnated ovum in the mother's womb and show that it is only a natural process under which it grows into a man, lives a life, dies and then takes a rebirth. No one compels him to take a rebirth. He does it under the compulsion of his own thoughts.

XXXIX. सूक्ष्मा मातापित्रजाः सह प्रभूतैस्त्विधा विशेषाः स्युः ।
सूक्ष्मास्तेषां नियता, मातापित्रजा निवर्तन्ते ॥ ३६ ॥

sūkṣmā mātā-pitrjāḥ
saha prabhūtais-tridhā viśeṣāḥ syuḥ ।
sūkṣmās-teṣām niyatā,
mātā-pitrjā nivartante ॥

XXXIX. The Viśeṣa bodies (mark the word Viśeṣa) are three-fold, viz., the (Sūkṣma) subtle body, the gross bodies born of parents and with the great elements (Mahābhūtas); of these, the Sūkṣma body is lasting, while the two bodies born of parents perish.

Notes

1. The two bodies born of parents are perishable. According to the commentators, hair, blood and flesh come from the mother, while bone, tendon and marrow are derived from the father.

2. There is seemingly a very great difference between the Sāṃkhya and the Vedānta about the conception of the Sūkṣma body. According to Vedānta, the Sūkṣma body is an assemblage of Buddhi, Mind, the ten organs, and the five Prāṇas, and this is also called the Limga.¹

Sāṃkhya, however, contradicts the idea. It says that the Sūkṣma body is only a Viśeṣa, i.e., only a component of an Aviśeṣa.

That Aviśeṣa is the Limga referred to in the next two Kārikās. It may be borne in mind that for all practical purposes we can take the Limga to be the same as Buddhi or the Saṃskāra. It is this Limga which creates all the fourteen kinds of Sūkṣma bodies of man and all other animals (See Kārikā LIII below). The Limga is thus the subtle energy (in the form of thoughts) which creates all the different types of the Sūkṣma bodies.

¹ शरीरं सप्तदशभिः सूक्ष्मं, वल्लिङ्गमुच्यते ।

XL. पूर्वोत्पन्नमसक्तं नियतम्महदादिसूक्ष्मपर्यन्तम् ।
संसरति निरुपभोगं भावैरधिवासितं लिङ्गम् ॥ ४० ॥

pūrvotpannam, asaktam,
niyatam, mahdādi-sūksma-paryantam |
samśarati nirupabhogam
bhāvair-adhvīśitam lingam ||

XL. The Linga which is a mere collection of thoughts ; which is the first thing or which was formed prior to all other things ; which is not attached to any particular body (*i.e.*, which can assume all the fourteen kinds of subtle bodies) ; which is eternal ; which can penetrate into all subtle things from Mahattattva down-wards ; which cannot enjoy—this Linga migrates.

Notes

1. This Linga being a mere subtle energy in potential state, and having not got a material body built up of Tanmātras, cannot enjoy. Moreover, being mere potential energy, it cannot even manifest itself unless it acts upon a grosser substance like the Tanmātras. In other words, it does not remain without a Sūkṣma body. That is why Vedānta says that there is no difference between a Linga and a Sūkṣma body.

But Śāmkhya's conception of a separate

Limga is necessary to explain the process of transmigration.

Animals and men have not the same type of Sūkṣma body. When a man takes his rebirth as an animal or *vice versa*, how could the Sūkṣma body change from one type to another?

Sāṁkhya says that there is no difficulty, because the Limga is the Aviśeṣa of all the Viśeṣa Sūkṣma bodies of all types. It can assume the requisite type of Sūkṣma body, just as a ray of sunlight can assume any of its component colours according to the nature of the substance on which it falls. This will be explained in the next two Kārikās.

XLI. चित्रं यथाश्चयस्ति स्थानवादिभ्यो विना यथाच्छाया ।
 तद्विना विशेषैन् तिष्ठति निराश्रयं लिङ्गम् ॥ ४१ ॥
 citram yathā-'śrayam-ṛte,
 sthāṇvādibhyo-vinā yathā-cchāyā ।
 tadvad vinā viśeṣair-
 na tiṣṭhati nirāśrayam liṅgam ॥

XLI. Just as a picture cannot exist without a base (or canvas), or a shadow without a substance on which to fall, so too, Limga (being mere subtle energy in the form of thought) cannot manifest itself without a Viśeṣa (a Sūkṣma body), which it itself creates.

XLII. पुरुषार्थहेतुकमिदं निमित्तनैमित्तिकप्रसङ्गेन ।

प्रकृतेर्विभूत्योगान्नटवद्वयविष्टते लिङ्गम् ॥ ४२ ॥

puruṣārtha-hetukam-idam

nimitta-naimittika-prasāṅgena ।

prakṛter-vibhutvayogān-

naṭavad-vyavatiṣṭhate liṅgam ॥

XLII. This Liṅga, by virtue of its connection with what may be called causes and their effects, behaves (*i.e.*, migrates) like an actor in a play playing different parts ; it does so for the enjoyment and ultimate good of the Puruṣa ; all this is possible on account of Prakṛti's all-powerful nature.

Notes

1. The expression Prakṛti's "Vibhutva Yoga" indicates that transmigration also is a natural process.

2. Ordinarily, we understand that a man goes either to heaven or hell, according to his own actions. As stated above, Sāṃkhya knows of no such fruit of action. It only knows the Saṃskāra and the thoughts coming into it. They act and react upon each other, and their resultant at any given moment determines our act at that particular moment.

The resultant of all thoughts at the time of death, determines the next birth.

The Liṅga first creates a Sūkṣma body by this resultant force of thoughts. It may be any of the Sūkṣma bodies of the several types ; viz., Daiva (of gods), human, Gāndharva (of Gandharvas) and so forth. Then the Liṅga enters into the new Sūkṣma body, leaving the old one.

On this point there is no difference between Sāṃkhya and Vedānta, as I have shown in the Assamese booklet of mine referred to above.

In this way the continuity of the Liṅga is preserved through all births. It only changes dress like an actor in a play. (Compare Gītā, II, 22).

3. Rebirth is necessary for the good of the Puruṣa, says Sāṃkhya, because it is a natural process of evolution towards self-realization, i.e., to grow in knowledge, power and delight.

4. Nimitta Naimittika :—These terms are more clearly explained in Kārikā XLIV and XLV below.

XLIII. सांसिद्धिकाश्च भावः प्राकृतिका वैकृतिकाश्च धर्माद्याः ।

दृष्टाः करणाश्रयिणः कार्याश्रयिणश्च कललाद्याः ॥ ४३ ॥

sāṃsiddhikāś-ca bhāvāḥ

prākṛtikā vaikṛtikāś-ca dharmādyāḥ ।

dṛṣṭāḥ karaṇā-'śrayināḥ,

kāryā-'śrayināś-ca kalalādyāḥ ॥

XLIII. Each of the eight kinds of thoughts beginning with Dharma is partly innate and partly acquired, i.e., acquired in previous lives and in this life; they are dependent (for their nourishment) upon the Buddhi, but the Embryo with all its subsequent development is dependent (for its nourishment) upon the effected (*viz.*, the finished products or food, i.e., the body).

Notes

1. Gaudapāda has divided the thoughts of the Limga into three categories. But the above two categories will serve our purpose. They are well-known divisions and are easily understood.

2. Science does not or cannot admit a previous birth and for that reason, it was so long held that all our thoughts were acquired in this life. The child is born with a blank mind, a '*tabula rasa*', on which thoughts are impressed as he grows up. This psychology served our purpose so long as it was thought that the objects of the world are exactly as we see them.

But, now that modern science has reduced the physical world to a mere display of electro-magnetic waves and the perception of it to a mere index-reading or deciphering by

the mind, the question arises, how could the child see the world as we see it, unless he had worldly thoughts in his mind which alone can furnish him with the code to read a cipher message or a key to an index-reading.

Accordingly, science now thinks it to be an open question whether some of our thoughts are not innate :

"This question", says Eddington, "may be like enquiring whether the hen came first or the egg ; and it is not very important to decide. We might well leave the question open, whether the 'form of thoughts' that dominate our outlook are acquired or innate." (*Philosophy of Physical Science*, p. 112). (This matter has been discussed at greater length in my Assamese booklet referred to above.)

XLIV. धर्मेण गमनमूर्ध्वं, गमनमधस्ताङ्गवत्यधर्मेण ।

ज्ञानेन चापवर्गोऽविषयते बन्धः ॥ ४४ ॥

dharmeṇa gamanam-ūrdhvam,
gamanam-adhastād-bhavaty-adharmeṇa ।
jñānena cā-pavargo-
viparyayād-iṣyate bandhah ॥

XLV. वैराग्यात् प्रकृतिलयः, संसारो भवति राजसाद्रागात् ।

ऐश्वर्यादविवातो विपर्ययात्तद्विपर्यासः ॥ ४५ ॥

vairāgyāt prakṛtilayah,
 samsāro-bhavati rājasād-rāgāt !
 aiśvaryād-avighāto-
 viparyayāt-tadviparyāsaḥ ॥

XLIV & XLV. Dharma enables a man to go up (*i.e.*, to go to a better world), Adharma to go downwards ; Jñāna (wisdom) leads him to release ; Ajñāna (ignorance) to bondage ; Vairāgya (non-attachment) results in merger in Prakṛti ; Avairāgya, which is a result of Rājasika thoughts, makes a man passionately attached to the world. Aiśvarya leads to non-obstruction of desire (*i.e.*, it enables one to get whatever he wishes for), the opposite, (*i.e.*, Anaiśvarya) gives the contrary result.

Notes

1. These are the causes and the effects spoken of in Kārikā XLII above.¹ See also Kārikā XXIII.
2. Sāṃkhya has thus shown that in this world we are concerned with our thoughts alone. Thoughts determine our actions, our conduct and our rebirth. Thoughts are the

¹ The Gītā, dividing these eight kinds of thoughts only into three categories for the sake of simplicity, has a separate śloka corresponding to Kārikās XLIV & XLV. (See Gītā XIV, 18.)

ultimate cause of everything that concerns us. It will be said later on that when a man can get rid of all these seven kinds of thoughts he attains liberation.

3. Our search into the sense-world is now over. We have understood how we perceive by our sense-organs. It will be shown in the next six Kārikās how difficult it is for us to obtain true knowledge of anything with our sensory equipment just described.

We were told that we can acquire true physical or symbolical knowledge (as opposed to the intimate knowledge referred to in Kārikā I) only in three ways, *viz.*, (i) by direct cognition by the senses, (ii) by logical inference, (iii) by testimony of the wise.

It will now be shown that these methods are not always sure to lead us to true knowledge. The first method is liable to be vitiated by inherent incapacity or infirmity of the senses ; the second by the inability of the Buddhi to grasp ; and the third by our not being able to understand what is said.

Accordingly, for epistemological enquiry, the whole subject has been divided into four main groups, *viz.*, (i) false knowledge (*Viparyaya*), (ii) infirmity of sense organs (*Aśakti*), (iii) disinclination of the mind to ascertain true knowledge, *i.e.*, its complacency (*Tuṣṭi*), (iv)

true knowledge (Siddhi). This brings us to Kārikā XLVI.

XLVI. एष प्रत्ययसर्गे विपर्ययाशक्तितुष्टिसिद्धाख्यः ।

गुणवैषम्य विमर्दात्, तस्य च भेदास्तु पञ्चाशत् ॥ ४६ ॥

esa pratyayasargo-viparyayā-
śakti-tuṣṭi-siddhyākhyah ।
guṇa-vaiṣamya-vimardāt
tasya ca bhedās-tu pañcāśat ॥

XLVI. This is the sense-world created by the Buddhi, its distinguishing characteristics are false knowledge (Viparyaya), infirmities (Aśakti), complacency (Tuṣṭi), and true knowledge (Siddhi) ; from these arise fifty different impediments to true knowledge ; and all these differences are due to the modes of working of the three Guṇas.

XLVII. पञ्च विपर्ययभेदा भवन्त्यशक्तिश्च करणवैकल्यात् ।

अष्टाविंशति भेदा तुष्टिनवधाष्टधा सिद्धिः ॥ ४७ ॥

pañca viparyaya-bhedā
bhavanty-aśaktiś-ca karaṇa-vaikalyāt ।
aṣṭāvimiṁśati-bheda
tuṣṭir navadhā-ṣṭadhā siddhiḥ ॥

XLVII. Five are the varieties of false knowledge ; infirmities due to organic defects are twenty-eight in number ; complacency of

the mind is of nine kinds ; true knowledge has eight divisions.

Notes

1. The five varieties of Viparyaya are Tamas, Moha, Mahāmoha, Tāmisra and Andha-tāmisra—corresponding to Avidyā, Asmitā, Rāga, Dveṣa and Abhiniveśa of Patañjali.

Each of these five main groups of false knowledge can be further sub-divided as shown in the next Kārikā—the total sub-divisions coming to sixty-two in number.

XLVIII. भेदस्तमसोऽश्विधोमोहस्य च, दशविधोमहामोहः ।

तामिस्रोऽष्टादशधा, तथा भवत्यन्धतामिसः ॥ ४८ ॥

bhedas-tamaso-'śtavidhaḥ,
mohasya ca, daśavidho-mahāmohaḥ ।
tāmisro-'ṣṭādaśadhā,
tathā bhavaty-andhatāmisrah ॥

XLVIII. Tamas (Avidyā) is of eight kinds ; Moha (Asmitā) also eight kinds ; Mahāmoha (Rāga) ten kinds ; Tāmisra (Dveṣa) eighteen, so also eighteen of Andha-tāmisra (Abhiniveśa).

Notes

1. Avidyā or Tamas is the false knowledge which makes a man think that either one or

another of the following eight Tattvas, *viz.*, Prakṛti, Mahattattva or Buddhi, the ego-sense and the five Tanmātras, is the ultimate reality, *i.e.*, the Soul. Therefore, there are eight varieties of this false knowledge. (See Kārikā LXI.)

2. It has been said in Kārikā XXIII that there are eight varieties of power, *e.g.*, Aṇimā, which a man can acquire by practice of Yoga.

Now, Asmitā or Moha means the conceit of a man who has attained one of these powers. Such Asmitā disqualifies a man for self-realization, and it can be of eight kinds, corresponding to each of the said powers.

3. The objects of enjoyment are ten, *viz.*, the five Tanmātras and the five Mahābhūtas. To be attached to one of them is Rāga or Mahāmoha—which is therefore of ten kinds.

4. The five Tanmātras, five Mahābhūtas and the above eight super-human powers are the eighteen objects of enjoyment. To be deprived of any one of them gives rise to Dvesa or Tāmisra. Tāmisra is therefore of eighteen kinds.

5. Abhiniveśa or Andha-Tāmisra is the fear of being deprived of the above eighteen objects of enjoyment by death. It is therefore of eighteen kinds.

XLIX. एकादशेन्द्रियबधाः सह बुद्धिवधैरशक्तिरुद्दिष्टा ।
 सप्तदशबधां बुद्धेर्विपर्ययात्तुष्टिसिद्धीनाम् ॥ ४८ ॥

ekādaśe-'ndriya-vadhāḥ
 saha buddhivadhair-aśaktir-uddistā ।
 saptadaśa-vadhā buddher-
 viparyayāt-tuṣṭisiddhīnām ॥

XLIX. The infirmities of the eleven organs, together with the infirmities of the Buddhi alone, are said to be the twenty-eight infirmities (referred to in *Kārikā XLVII*) ; Buddhi's own infirmities can be divided into seventeen sub-divisions according to the impediments to true knowledge in the nine varieties of *Tuṣṭi* (complacency) and the eight kinds of true knowledge (*Siddhi*), described below.

Notes

1. The eleven infirmities of the organs such as deafness, blindness, paralysis, lunacy etc. are in fact ultimately traceable to Buddhi's own infirmity, Buddhi being the creator of the entire sense-world. The nine varieties of *Tuṣṭi* and the eight varieties of impediments to true knowledge which may be found in the eight *Siddhis*, are similarly traceable to Buddhi. But these seventeen varieties are independent of the sense-organs and have therefore been called Buddhi's own infirmity.

L. आध्यात्मिकास्वतसः प्रकृत्युपादानकालभाग्याख्याः ।
 बाह्या विषयोपरमात् पञ्च, नव तुष्ट्योऽभिमताः ॥ ५० ॥

ādhyātmikāś-catasraḥ,
 prakṛty-upādāna-kāla-bhāgyā-'khyāḥ ।
 bāhyā viṣayoparamāt pañca,
 nava tuṣṭayo-'bhimatāḥ ॥

L. Tuṣṭi (complacency) is of eight kinds : four arising in one's own mind, viz., (i) Prakṛti (nature), (ii) Upādāna (means), (iii) Time, (iv) Luck ; and five arising out of turning away from the five objects of enjoyment.

Notes

1. Tuṣṭi is really a kind of indolence which prevents a man from proceeding further in search of true knowledge—e.g., a man reads the Sāṃkhya philosophy and understands that the object of this creation is the enjoyment and the final release of every soul however sinful ; understanding this, he thinks that his final release is certain ; it is only a question of time, or good luck or a little practice of some sort of austerity ; he remains content with this idea and makes no further attempt for self-realization. These are the four forms of internal Tuṣṭi referred to in the first part of the above Kārikā.

2. The five kinds of external Tuṣṭi are due to abstinence from the five objects of sense enjoyment. Abstinence is no doubt necessary, but mere abstinence will not help a man much in the path of self-realization. A man, for instance, is quite content without wealth, because he thinks that it is difficult to acquire it, more difficult to spend it, and it may give rise to various troubles and so forth. Such complacency, due to indolence, is a real impediment to self-realization.

LI. जहः शब्दोऽध्ययनं दुःखविघाताख्यः सुहृत्प्राप्तिः ।
 दानं च सिद्धयोऽष्टौ, सिद्धेः पूर्वोऽङ्गकुशस्त्रिविधः ॥ ५१ ॥
*giving away of
the essence of
the shenفات,
others.*
 ūhaḥ, śabdo-'dhyayanam,
 duḥkha-vighātās-trayah suhṛtprāptih ।
 dānam ca siddhayo-'ṣṭau,
 siddeḥ pūrvo'ṅkuśas-trividhah ॥

LI. The eight ways to attain true knowledge are : (i) independent thinking and reasoning (by a man of genius), (ii) oral instructions, (iii) study, (iv, v & vi) instructions as to how to suppress the three kinds of misery, (vii) friendly discussion and (viii) gifts which serve the purpose of acquiring true knowledge ; those three mentioned before, i.e., Viparyaya, Aśakti and Tuṣṭi are hindrances to attainment of true knowledge.

1. The word *Ūhaḥ* means genius. Some men of genius may merely by independent thinking realize the difference between the Puruṣa and Prakṛti and thereby attain self-realization. Kapila is said to have been born with such knowledge.

2. Other men referred to in (*iv*, *v* and *vi*) above, being afflicted by three kinds of miseries, go to a Preceptor for means to end them. They also can attain self-knowledge.

LII. न विना भावैलिङ्गं, न विना लिङ्गेन भावनिर्वत्तिः ।
लिङ्गाख्यो भावाख्यस्तस्माद्द्विविधः प्रवर्तते सर्गं ॥ ५२ ॥

na vinā bhāvair-lim̄gam,
na vinā lim̄gena bhāva-nirvṛttih ।
lim̄gākhyo-bhāvākhyas-
tasmād-dvividhaḥ pravartate sargah ॥

LII. Without a sense-world, there could not be a physical world and without a physical world there could not be enjoyment of the sense-world ; therefore, there are two different creations, *viz.*, the sense-world (Bhāvākhyā Sarga) and the physical world (Lim̄gākhyā Sarga).

Notes

1. This Kārikā is self-explanatory in the light of what has been said above. Gauḍa-

pāda has made it clearer when he says that “Bhāva” means the Pratyaya Sarga of Kārikā XLVI and “Liṅga” means the physical world made of Tanmātras.

It must however be borne in mind that these two worlds are inter-dependent. They are like two poles of a magnet and one cannot exist without the other. In the very first place, it has been stated in Kārikā XLI that the Liṅga of the sense-world cannot exist without a subtle body made of Tanmātras which are ingredients taken from the physical world.

Similarly, it will be said in Kārikās LIV and LV below that in the physical universe all created beings beginning from Brahmā down to a blade of grass have each a Liṅga —a collection of thoughts, and thoughts belong to the sense-world.

The two worlds, *viz.*, the sense-world and the physical world, are, therefore, not only inseparable but they act and react upon each other. This is so, because thoughts and gross energy (Tanmātras) are convertible. Energy coming from the external world ends in thoughts in our mind, and when we give expression to our thoughts, they become sound or heat or such other energy and disappear into space (See Introduction, Part II). The

conversion of thoughts into energy and *vice-versa* is a continuous process. This makes it clear that in this world no one has a separate existence, apart from the others. All are linked in a secret one-ness. Śrī Aurobindo says : "For this is the truth in nature that this Ego which thinks itself a separate being, claims to live for itself, is not and cannot be separate, nor can it live to itself even if it would but rather all are linked together by a Secret One-ness. Each existence is continually giving out *perforce* from its stock. Out of its mental receipts from nature, or its vital and physical assets, a stream goes out to all that is around it. And always again it receives something from its environment in return. For it is by this giving and receiving that it can effect its own growth while at the same time it helps the sum of things." (*Synthesis of Yoga*, p. 68).

This conclusion of the Saṁkhya Philosophy has the support of modern science. For, according to science, nobody has any existence at all unless he has a relation to another object in the universe, and beyond space-time everything has only one common existence (Introduction, Part II). Thus, A. D. Ritchie says : "He (Eddington) points out, as Whitehead has done too, that there is no such thing as an independently existing individual,

True, everything is what it is and not something else ; but it is what it is in an environment without which it will not be anything in particular, nor even exist at all.....yet, if it is true that the character of everything depends on its relations to other things—and modern theories of space-time hardly permit of any other assumption—if that is true, then there must be some universal relation capable of mathematical expression between the parts whatever they are, out of which things are constructed, and the whole lot of things taken together.”

This is the wondrous world we live in. As stated above, both these worlds were created at a time when there was no time. The question, therefore, does not arise as to which of them was created first.

LIII. अष्ट विकल्पो दैवस्तैर्यग्योनश्च पञ्चधा भवति ।

मानुषकर्षचैकविधः समासतो भौतिकः सर्गः ॥ ५३ ॥

aṣṭa-vikalpo-daivas-

tairyagyonaś-ca pañcadhā bhavati ;
mānuṣakaś-caikavidhah

समासतो भौतिकः सर्गः ॥

LIII. The Super-human creation (Daiva Sarga) is of eight different kinds, the Sub-human creation is of five kinds ; the Human

creation is of one variety; such, in brief, is the physical creation of the Bhūtas (*i.e.*, Tanmātras).

Notes

1. The Super-human creation is of eight different kinds, *viz.*, Brāhma, Prājāpatya, Aindra, Paitra, Gāndharva, Yākṣa, Rākṣasa and Paiśāca.

The Sub-human creation consists of five different orders, *viz.*, cattle, wild animals, birds, reptiles and immovable objects, *e.g.*, trees, vegetables and minerals.

2. Every created being in these fourteen kinds of creations has a sūkṣma body—there are thus fourteen types of subtle bodies as stated above.

The object of creation is said to be the evolution of the Limga from matter to spirit through successive rebirths.

Thus, the Tantras which are based on the Sāṃkhya philosophy assign eight millions of plant and animal lives as the sum of the preparations for a human birth.

The Viṣṇu Purāṇa also says the same thing.

LIV. उच्चं सत्त्वविशालस्तमोविशालश्च मूलतः सर्गः ।
मध्ये रजोविशालो, ब्रह्मादिस्तम्बपर्यन्तः ॥ ५४ ॥

ūrdhvam sattva-viśālah,
 tamo-viśālaś-ca mūlataḥ sargah ।
 madhye rajo viśalo,
 brahmādi-stambha-paryantah ॥

LIV. High up, (*i.e.*, in the Super-human creation) Sattva predominates ; at the bottom, Tamas ; in the middle, Rajas ; this is so from Brahmā down to a blade of grass.

Notes

1. The temper of all these creatures of the fourteen orders has been divided into three sub-divisions.

LV. तत्र जरामरणकृतं दुःखम्प्राप्नोति चेतनः पुरुषः ।
 लिङ्गस्याविनिवृत्तेस्तस्माददुःखं खभावेन ॥ ५५ ॥

tatra jarā-maraṇa-kṛtam
 duḥkham prāpnōti cetanah puruṣah ।
 liṅgasyā-vinivṛtteh,
 tasmād-duḥkham svabhāvena ॥

LV. Here (*i.e.*, in these fourteen different orders of the creation) the conscious Puruṣa has to undergo the misery consequent on decay by old age and death, until the Liṅga ceases to function ; hence misery is naturally inevitable.

Notes

1. The subtle body which is created by the Limga migrates through all these fourteen orders of creation. The Puruṣa as long as he has a Limga has to take a rebirth after death.

Death and rebirth are therefore inevitable. But when the Limga is dissolved, *i.e.*, when the Puruṣa parts with Prakṛti, there cannot be a rebirth, and the Puruṣa then attains liberation as stated in Kārikās LXI-LXV (but see also Kārikā LXVI).

LVI. इत्येष प्रकृतिक्रतोमहदादि विशेषभूतपर्यन्तः ।
प्रतिपुरुषविमोक्षार्थं स्वार्थं इव परार्थं आरम्भः ॥ ५६ ॥

ity-eṣa prakṛti-kṛto-
mahadādi-viśeṣa-bhūta-paryantah ।
prati-puruṣa-vimokṣarthaṁ
svārtha iva parārtha ārambhah ॥

LVI. This is the creation brought about by Prakṛti and consisting of Mahattattva down to the gross elements and their components. The object of this creation is the release of every soul ; this (creation) is for the benefit (*i.e.*, the enjoyment and final release therefrom) of another (*i.e.*, the Puruṣa), although it seems as if Prakṛti is doing all these for her own benefit.

Notes

1. This Kārikā and the next Kārikā, too, seem at first to be a mere unnecessary repetition of what has already been said before.

But the object is to remind us that the creation has an object and it is not a mere blind display of natural forces. The phenomenon is that Nature is working of her own accord. But really all this is for the benefit of the Puruṣa. This Kārikā is, therefore, to remind us that, for reasons given in Kārikā XVII, Prakṛti must have been organized by an intelligent being.

LVII. वत्सविवृद्धिनिमित्तं क्षीरस्य यथा प्रवृत्तिरज्ञस्य ।

पुरुषविमोक्षनिमित्तं तथा प्रवृत्तिः प्रधानस्य ॥ ५७ ॥

vatsa-vivṛddhi-nimittam

ksīrasya yathā pravṛttir-ajñasya ।

puruṣa-vimokṣa-nimittam

tathā pravṛttiḥ pradhānasya ॥

LVII. As milk is secreted in the cow's udder for the nourishment of the calf and as the said secretion automatically ceases when the calf has grown up, so does Nature act spontaneously for the release of the Puruṣa (and ceases to act when the object is attained).

Notes

1. It is suggested in this Kārikā that if we keep in mind that the universe is a single organization (like the organism of the cow's body) there should be no mystery about inanimate forces like the Guṇas working like an animate person with a pre-thought.

2. The next question that arises is : What is the object of this creation ? Why is it necessary to create a Puruṣa first and then to release him with such a great display or organization of forces ? The Avyakta could have always remained an Avyakta ; why did he create at all ? On this point neither Sāṃkhya nor Vedānta can give us a satisfactory reply, as will be seen from the next Kārikā.

LVIII. औत्सुक्यनिवृत्यर्थं यथा क्रियासु प्रवर्तते लोकः ।

पुरुषस्य विमोक्षार्थं प्रवर्तते तद्वदव्यक्तम् ॥ ५८ ॥

autsukya-nivṛtty-arthaṁ

yathā kriyāsu pravartate lokah ।
puruṣasya vimokṣārthaṁ

pravartate tadvad-avyaktm ॥

LVIII. Just as a man in order to satisfy a curiosity engages himself in play, so does the Avyakta for enjoyment and final release of the Puruṣa.

Notes

1. This is exactly what Vedānta says.
(Brahma-Sūtra, II-1-33).

LIX. रङ्गस्य दर्शयित्वा निवर्तते नृत्कौ यथा नृत्यात् ।
पुरुषस्य तथाऽऽत्मानं प्रकाश्य विनिवर्तते प्रकृति ॥ ५६ ॥

raṅgasya darśayitvā
nivartate nartakī yathā nr̥tyāt ।
puruṣasya tathā-'tmānam
prakāśya vinivartate prakṛtiḥ ॥

LIX. As a dancing girl desists from dancing having exhibited herself to the audience, so does Prakṛti desist after having exhibited herself to the Puruṣa.

Notes

1. Prakṛti's body consists of Buddhi, and the other 23 Tattvas. When Puruṣa understands these Tattvas, he is liberated and Prakṛti's work is over. She then ceases to act (*i.e.*, the creation ends). She disappears from the view of the Puruṣa (Kārikā LXI).

2. The real difficulty about this Kārikā is, that according to it, Prakṛti ceases to act (*i.e.*, the creation ends) as soon as a single soul is liberated. To avoid this difficulty it has been said that Prakṛti is like a dancing girl whose exhibition is meant for the general

public. Although some persons (*e.g.*, the dancing-master or the stage-manager) might have seen her, she would not desist from dancing until the entire audience is satisfied.

This is only an analogy and it is neither a proof nor an explanation which gives us any idea of the mystery of the creation.

Much better is the other explanation, *viz.*, that according to Sāmkhya, not only are the Purusas many, but the Prakṛtis are also many, so that each Puruṣa has his own Prakṛti. This view has at least the merit of being scientific in the light of the new science which says that the physical world is subjective. We know that no two men see the same rainbow, although we think that we are all seeing the same rainbow, whenever there is a rainbow in the sky. Similarly, the theory of relativity has proved that no two creatures, living at two different points of space, can see the same world. There is, therefore no harm in thinking that each man creates his own world by his own Prakṛti.

LX. नानाविधैरुपायैरुपकारिण्यनुपकारिणः पुंसः ।

गुणवत्यगुणस्य सतस्तस्यार्थमपार्थकञ्चरति ॥ ६० ॥

nānā-vidhair-upāyair-

upakāriṇy-anupakāriṇah pumsah ।

guṇavaty-aguṇasya satas-

tasyārtham-apārthakam-carati ॥

LX. Without any benefit to herself, Prakṛti, who is endowed with the Guṇas, serves in manifold ways and thereby does good to the Puruṣa who is the eternal reality but who being devoid of the Guṇas (*i.e.*, being inactive) does not require her in any way.

Notes

1. The most important thing to note here is the adjective Sat or Aguṇa before the word Puruṣa. It shows that the Puruṣa is the only one Avyakta referred to in Kārikā X and that Prakṛti is quite a different thing.

What then is Prakṛti? If she had been as real as the Puruṣa himself, the latter could not have missed her. He, having become now the all-pervading Consciousness Itself, sees the whole truth at a glance; he sees nothing but the truth and cannot miss anything which is true. How can Prakṛti then disappear from his view, if she is anything real? In the next five Kārikās an answer to this most important question will be found.

LXI. प्रकृतेः सुकुमारतरन्न किञ्चिदस्तीति मे मतिर्भवति ।
या दृष्टाऽस्मीति पुनर्न दर्शनमुपैति पुरुषस्य ॥ ६१ ॥

prakṛteḥ sukumārataram-
 na kiñcid astīti me matir bhavati ।
 yā drṣṭāsmī-ti punar-
 na darśanam upaiti-puruṣasya ॥

LXI. (The Puruṣa thinks) “I have now come to know that there is no other easily comprehensible (phenomenal) cause of the creation than Prakṛti—Prakṛti who knowing that she has been seen by a Puruṣa will never again come to the view of the said Puruṣa”.

Notes

1. Here the word “Sukumāratara” is very suggestive. According to Gauḍapāda it means “that which can be easily understood”.

2. The Puruṣa must first understand that Prakṛti is only the phenomenal cause of this creation and is not the ultimate reality. It has already been said in Kārikā XLVIII that not to know this is Tamas or Avidyā. The Puruṣa must first get rid of this Avidyā ; and only then he can proceed to know his own self and, after knowing it, part with Prakṛti for ever. This is implied by the expression “iti me matirbhavati” at the end of the first line of this Kārikā.

On attaining this knowledge, the Puruṣa will at once know that so long he was being

worked by Prakṛti. What he will then understand, has been stated in the next Kārikā. The connecting link between these two Kārikās is the word “Tasmāt” with which Kārikā LXII begins. (See also Kārikā LXV).

LXII. तस्मान् बध्यतेऽङ्गा न मुच्यते नापि संसरति कश्चित् ।

संसरति बध्यते मुच्यते च नानाश्रया प्रकृतिः ॥ ६२ ॥

tasmān-na badhyate-'ddhā
namucyate nā 'pi samsarati kaścit !
samsarati badhyate mucyate ca
nānā-'śrayā prakṛtiḥ ॥

LXII. For this reason (the Puruṣa now understands) it is only the Prakṛti, in her manifold forms, that suffers bondage, migrates and is finally liberated ; the Puruṣa is never under bondage, nor is he liberated, nor does he migrate.

Notes

1. The Puruṣa being all-pervading consciousness cannot undergo any modification. He always remains the same in all successive births. Being static, he does not move, nor is there any place for him to go to because he is always present at every place.

This is a common ground for all Indian Philosophies. According to Buddhism, it is

only the “Saṃskāra” (*i.e.*, the Buddhi or the Linga) that migrates. So say the Upaniṣads. So says the Gītā. The next question is how does Prakṛti bind herself and how does she release herself. This question will be answered in the next Kārikā.

LXIII. रूपैः सप्तभिरेव तु बध्नात्यात्मानमात्मना प्रकृतिः ।

सैव च पुरुषार्थमति विमोचयत्येकरूपेणा ॥ ६३ ॥

rūpaiḥ saptabhir-eva tu

badhnāty-ātmānam-ātmanā prakṛtiḥ ।

saiva ca puruṣārtham-

prati vimocayaty-ekarūpeṇa ॥

LXIII. Prakṛti binds herself by the seven forms (of thoughts) and she herself releases herself through the remaining one form, for the benefit of the Puruṣa.

Notes

1. The reference here is to Kārikā No. XXIII, where it is said that the Buddhi is a mere collection of thoughts which are divisible into eight categories. All these thoughts except one, *viz.*, Jñāna, are creations of Prakṛti, and she alone can terminate them by natural means such as are prescribed, say, in the Pātañjala Philosophy or in Kārikā LXIV below.

It is, therefore, said in this Kārikā that Prakṛti binds herself by seven kinds of thoughts, viz., virtue, vice, ignorance, attachment, non-attachment, power and want of power. When a man gets rid of all these kinds of thoughts, he parts with Prakṛti for ever. These seven kinds of thoughts are like a screen over his head and as soon as they are removed, he sees the reality which is he himself. He cannot remove the screen himself being entirely inactive.

This will be made clearer in the next Kārikā—where it will be also explained why Puruṣa cannot part with Prakṛti unless Prakṛti herself parts from him first.

LXIV. एवत्तत्वाभ्यासाद्वास्मि न मे नाहमित्यपरिशेषम् ।

अविपर्ययाद्विशुद्धं केवलसुत्पद्यते ज्ञानम् ॥ ६४ ॥

evam-tattvā-'bhyāsā-
nā-'smi na me nā-'ham-ity-apariśeṣam ।
aviparyayād-viśuddham
kevalam utpadyate jñānam ॥

LXIV. In this way, practising the twenty-four Tattvas, there results that Jñāna (consciousness)—“I do not exist”, “nothing is mine”, “I am not”—which Jñāna is all-comprehensible, without impurity, and absolute.

Notes

1. This Kārikā speaks of the Puruṣa who has been able to destroy his ego-sense. One means to destroy it is by constant practice of the twentyfour Tattvas.

In Kārikā XXXVII it was said that this can be done only with the help of the Buddhi. Buddhi is Prakṛti's own creation. Without it, the Puruṣa cannot enjoy, cannot think, nor can do anything for self-realization or for any other purpose.

Enjoyment (which includes suffering of miseries), and the subsequent liberation of the soul, constitute but one single natural process of evolution of the Buddhi from ignorance to perfect wisdom. The Puruṣa is here only a passive spectator.

2. The Jñāna which is referred to in this Kārikā does not mean symbolical knowledge or physical experience. It is intimate knowledge. It is consciousness itself.

3. In the next Kārikā, we shall know what is Sāṃkhya's conception of Prakṛti, or in other words, what the liberated soul will know the Prakṛti to be.

LXV. तेन निवृत्तप्रसवामर्थवशात् समरूपविनिवृत्ताम् ।

प्रकृतिं पश्यति पुरुषः प्रेक्षकवद्वस्थितः सच्चः ॥ ६५ ॥

tena nivṛtta-prasavām-
arthavaśāt saptā-rūpa-vinivṛttām !
prakṛtim paśyati puruṣah,
prekṣakavad-avasthitah svacchah ॥

LXV. By that intimate knowledge (referred to in the preceding Kārikā) and being restored to himself, the Puruṣa sees, like a spectator (from a distance), the Prakṛti who has now become unproductive and devoid of her seven forms.

Notes

1. What does the Puruṣa now see of the Prakṛti ? Prakṛti's body, as said above in Kārikā LIX, consisted only of the Buddhi and the other Tattvas which are a creation of the Buddhi. Her shape, as said above, is the seven forms of thoughts. Where could the thoughts go ? How could they become unproductive or inoperative ?

Thoughts, says Sāmkhya, are not objective. The moon, for instance, is an objective something ; she will go on moving in the sky whether there be a man to see her or not. But thoughts, or feelings like pleasure or pain, are not like that. Unless a man sees them (*i.e.*, think of them), they cannot be said to have an existence of their own. We have got all sorts of thoughts in our mind—but they

are all dead thoughts, and it is only when we recall any one of them to our consciousness that it becomes a thought—a living thought. Otherwise, thoughts do not exist in their own right.

Similarly, now that the Buddhi has parted with the Puruṣa, all the stored-up thoughts become dead thoughts without a seer to see them. They have lost that connection with the conscious element which so long made them what they were. They now become unobservable and un-knowable or non-existent.

The liberated Purusa now understands this. To him therefore Prakṛti has no separate existence. She so long existed in his own mind.

2. As said above, the present Kārikā refers to the Puruṣa who has been able to completely sever his connection with Prakṛti by destroying his ego-sense. He become Pure Consciousness. His individuality is lost in the Avyakta. No question arises whether he can again be born, (*c.f.*, Brahma-Sūtra IV, 4, 1-6). But such cases are rare. Ordinarily, the ego-sense is not completely destroyed even after attainment of true knowledge.

A Puruṣa even after he has attained true knowledge continues to think, "I now understand", "I am such and such". His connection

with Prakṛti still exists. Such cases will be discussed in the next Kārikā and it will be shown that such a Puruṣa will not be born again but his individuality will continue.

LXVI. दृष्टा मयेत्युपेक्षक एको, दृष्टाऽहमित्युपरमत्यन्या ।

सति संयोगे इपि तयोः प्रयोजनवास्ति सर्गस्य ॥ ६६ ॥

dṛṣṭā maye-'ty-upekṣaka-eko-
dṛṣṭā-'ham-ity-uparamaty-anyā ।
sati samyoge-'pi tayoh
prayojanam-nā- sti sargasya ॥

LXVI. One (the witness) says, "I have seen her" (I understand what she is), and so understanding, becomes indifferent; the other saying "I have been seen", desists (from further prompting); thus although there is still conjunction between the two, there is no need for further creation (*i.e.*, rebirth).

Notes

1. One essential condition for migration or re-birth is that the Liṅga at the time of death should be able to create a new subtle body of one of the fourteen types mentioned above.

In the case of the Puruṣa who has been able to suppress all thoughts except the ego-sense, his liṅga being devoid of all thoughts

except that one, cannot create a new subtle body, just as a fried seed cannot germinate. Such a Puruṣa after death cannot be born again,

Such a Puruṣa after his death will be free from bondage, he can assume any form he likes, and can go anywhere he likes (Compare Brahma-Sūtra IV, 4, 7-21. See Pātañjala Sūtra, I, 25, II—4). He is absolutely a free soul.

LXVII. सम्यगज्ञानाधिगमाद धर्मदीनामकारणप्राप्तौ ।

तिष्ठति संस्कारवशात्, चक्रभ्रमिवदृतशरौरः ॥ ६७ ॥

saṃyag-jñānā-dhigamād-
dharmādinām-akāraṇa-prāptau ।
tiṣṭhati saṃskāra-vaśat,
cakra-bhramivad-dhṛta-śarīrah ॥

LXVII. Even after attainment of perfect wisdom as a result of the seven kinds of thoughts, beginning with virtue, having become inoperative, the Puruṣa remains attached to the body (continues to live) for a while; because of his Saṃskāra which continues to function, just as a potter's wheel continues to move for a while by its own inertia even after the motive power has been withdrawn.

Notes

1. This Kārikā says that a man does not die immediately on attainment of intimate

knowledge. He will have to live his allotted life.

Vedānta also says the same thing (See Chāndogya VI, 14, 2).

LXVIII. प्राप्ते शरीरभेदे चरितार्थत्वात् प्रधानविनिवृत्तौ ।
एकान्तिकमात्यन्तिकमुभयं कैवल्यमाप्नोति ॥ ६८ ॥

prāpte śarīra-bhede
caritārthatvāt pradhāna-vinivṛttau ।
aikāntikam-ātyantikam-
ubhayam kaivalyam-āpnoti ॥

LXVIII. On being disassociated from the body, and Prakṛti having retired after doing all that was necessary, the Puruṣa attains that release which is both certain and final (because he will not be born again).

Notes

1. This Kārikā refers to Kārikā LXVI only, because the Puruṣa referred to in Kārikās LXIV-LXV has lost his individuality and nothing more can be said about him.

LXIX. पुरुषार्थज्ञानमिदं गुह्यपरम्परमर्पिणा समाख्यातम् ।
स्थित्युत्पत्तिप्रलयाद्विन्त्यन्ते यत्र भूतानाम् ॥ ६९ ॥

puruṣārtha-jñānam-idam
guhyam paramarṣiṇā samākhyātam ।
sthity-utpatti-pralayāś-
cintyante yatra bhūtānām ॥

LXIX. This abstruse philosophy, accessory to the attainment of the final objects of the Puruṣa, and which deals with the origin, existence and dissolution of all beings, was fully expounded by the great sage (Kapila).

Notes

1. Here ends Gauḍapāda's Bhāṣya—but he ended it with the following words :

"These are the seventy Kārikās and their Bhāṣya by Gauḍapāda." It seems clear that he had nothing more to say about Kārikā LXX which is self-explanatory and to which he had already referred in his notes on Kārikā I.

But some commentators think that one Kārikā must have been missing—otherwise Gauḍapāda would not have reckoned the LXIX-th Kārikā as the LXX-th—more especially when it is well-known that the Sāṃkhya Kārikās were seventy in number.

After great trouble, the so-called missing Kārikā has been reconstructed as in the footnote below¹ and has been given a place just

¹ कारणलोक्यरसेके पुरुषं कपिष्ठं परे स्वभावं वा ।

प्रजाः कथं निर्गुणतो व्यक्तः कालः स्वभावश्च ॥

kāraṇam Īśvaram eke puruṣam

kālam pare svabhāvam vā ।

prajāḥ katham nirguṇato-

vyaktaḥ kālaḥ svabhāvaś-ca ॥

below Kārikā LX. It has been conjectured that this Kārikā was wilfully deleted by someone in order to show that Sāṃkhya philosophy was not theistic.

But it is the main teaching of the Sāṃkhya philosophy that God directly did not create the universe, He being not active. (Part IV of the Introduction).

This patent fact cannot be concealed by stealing a Kārikā or two—and to deny this, will be a denial of the whole philosophy. If a Kārikā was wilfully deleted, why were the commentaries allowed to remain intact?

It is also strange that this missing Kārikā was missed by all commentators from the time of Iśvarakṛṣṇa downwards.

Apart from all such considerations, the missing Kārikā, as has been constructed now, is itself a proof that it could not have formed a part of the Sāṃkhya Philosophy. It does not add anything and it is only a clumsy repetition. Moreover, the very word “Nirguṇa” which occurs there, indicates that it could not have been written by Iśvarakṛṣṇa. According to Sāṃkhya, Guṇas, as well as any other thing in the world, exist in latent form in their root cause, viz., the Avayakta. In this sense, it will be a misnomer to call the Avyakta, Nirguṇa. The word used in Sāṃkhya

is Aguṇa and not Nirguṇa (See Kārikā LX above). The word Nirguṇa does not occur anywhere in the Kārikās.

LXX. एतत् पवित्रमग्न्युं मुनिरासुरयेऽनुकम्पया प्रददौ ।
आसुरिरपि पञ्चशिखाय तेन च बहुधा कृतलक्ष्मम् ॥ ७० ॥

etat pavitram-agryam
munir-āsuraye-'nukampayā-pradadau !
āsurir-api pañcaśikhāya,
tena ca bahudhā kṛtam-tantram ॥

Notes

LXX. This pure supreme knowledge was first imparted by the sage to Āsuri out of kindness to him and by Āsuri also to Pañcaśikha, and he (Pañcaśikha) elaborated it in various ways (or spread it in various places).

LXXI. शिष्यपरम्परयाऽऽगतमौश्वरकृष्णेन चैतदार्याभिः ।
संचित्प्रार्थमतिना सम्यग्विज्ञाय सिद्धान्तम् ॥ ७१ ॥

śiṣya-paramparayā-'gatam
Īśvarakṛṣṇena caitad-āryābhīḥ ।
saṃkṣiptam-āryamatinā¹
samyaag vijñāya siddhāntam ॥

LXXI. The learned Īśvarakṛṣṇa, realizing the whole truth, briefly set down in these Āryā metres the conclusions of this philosophy which

had been handed down through a succession of pupils.

LXXII. सप्तत्यां किल येऽर्थस्तेऽर्थाः कृत्स्नस्य षष्ठितन्वस्य ।
आख्यायिकाविरहिताः परवादविवर्जिताश्चापि ॥ ७२ ॥

saptatyām kila ye'rthās-
te'rthāḥ kṛtsnasya ṣaṣṭitantrasya ।
ākhyāyikāvirahitāḥ,
paravāda-vivarjitaś-cā'pi ॥

LXXII. The subjects of these seventy Kārikās are verily those of the entire Śaṣṭitantra; these Kārikās do not contain any illustrative tales, nor do they criticize rival views.

Notes

1. The Śaṣṭitantra to which reference has been made by Gauḍapāda also, as stated above, is now extinct. But in the Vyāsabhāṣya on the Yoga-Sūtra there is a reference to it. It dealt with sixty main topics, from which fact it derived its name.

What these sixty topics were is not clear. Vācaspati quoting from the Rājavārtika, gives the following list :

1. The existence of Pradhāna ;
2. Its one-ness ;
3. Its objectivity ;
4. Its difference from Puruṣa ;

5. Its subservience to Puruṣa ;
6. The manifoldness of Puruṣa ;
7. Disjunction of Soul and Nature ;
8. Conjunction of Soul and Nature ;
9. Continuance of embodiment and activity after the attainment of wisdom ;
10. Non-activity of Puruṣa ;

these are the principal topics. The other fifty are the five modes of Ignorance, the nine forms of Complacency, the twenty-eight forms of Infirmity, and the eight Attainments.

LXXIII. तस्मात् समासदृष्टं शास्त्रमिदं नार्थतस्य परिहीनम् ।
तन्वस्य च ब्रह्मभूत्तेऽपेण संक्रान्तमिव बिस्तम् ॥ ७३ ॥

tasmāt samāsa-dṛṣṭam
śāstram-idam nā-'rthataś-ca parihīnam
tantrasya-ca bṛhanmūrter-
darpaṇasaṅkrāntam-iva bimbam ॥

LXXIII. Hence this briefly expounded Śāstra is not defective and is, as it were, an image in a small mirror of a huge object like the Sastitantra.

Notes

1. This verse is to be found only in the Mathurā Commentary. It seems that Kārikās Nos. LXXI and LXXII were also tacked at some later date.

Correction slip for page 22

5th line. Read naive for native.

11th line. Read chance for change.



